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WHAT ARE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOR? THE
CASE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
CHRISTOPHER J. PETERS*
Abstract
District of Columbia v. Heller—the Supreme Court’s 2008 Second
Amendment decision—was the occasion for a momentous national
conversation that never happened. Heller sparked heated debates about the
Court’s originalist interpretive methodology, but virtually nobody asked
what should have been an obvious question: Even if the Court got the
meaning of the Second Amendment right, why should we obey that
amendment?
This is the curiously underexplored question of the authority of
constitutional rights: Why, indeed whether, we have some obligation to
respect those rights even when we disagree with them. The Second
Amendment brings that question front and center in a way arguably not
seen since the demise of the Fugitive Slave Clause 150 years ago. Like that
infamous clause, the Second Amendment features relatively specific text—
protecting a “right . . . to keep and bear Arms”—that itself is sufficient to
provoke controversy, regardless of precisely how that text is interpreted.
Americans who disagree with a “right” to abortion can take some comfort
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in the belief that the Supreme Court, in construing the Due Process
Clauses, got the meaning of “liberty” wrong. But Americans who disagree
with a “right . . . to keep and bear Arms” have no one to blame but the
Constitution itself.
Should these Americans nonetheless treat the Second Amendment as
authoritative, and if so, why? In seeking to answer that question, the
analysis in this Article suggests some important truths about constitutional
rights more generally. It suggests, first of all, that justifying the authority of
constitutional rights is not as easy as is often assumed. Most accounts of
constitutional authority are substantive in nature: they tell us to obey the
Constitution because of what the Constitution commands. The author
contends that none of these substantive accounts are plausible. The
authority of the Constitution must be justified procedurally—based not on
what it commands, but on how it commands us—or not at all.
Most interpretations of the Second Amendment, however, do not comport
with a procedural understanding of constitutional authority. A procedural
account does not justify Heller’s individual-self-defense reading of the
Amendment or the various “anti-tyranny” readings common in popular
discourse. Only the “structural federalism” interpretation advanced by the
dissenters in Heller is arguably consistent with a procedural account of
constitutional authority.
The implications of this conclusion extend well beyond the Second
Amendment itself. They imply a jurisdictional principle of constitutional
law, according to which other constitutional provisions and doctrines—
including, the author suggests, the abortion right and other aspects of
“substantive” due process—might lack a valid claim to constitutional
authority. They also suggest a principle of constitutional interpretation: all
else being equal, the Court should interpret a constitutional provision in the
way that best justifies its authority over us.
Table of Contents
Abstract .................................................................................................... 433
I. Introduction: The Second Amendment and the Question
of Constitutional Authority ...................................................................... 435
II. What Is Constitutional Authority (and Why Should We Care)? .......... 440
A. The Concept of Legal Authority ..................................................... 441
B. Legitimate Authority ....................................................................... 445
C. The Particular Dynamics of Constitutional Authority ..................... 447
D. The Special Problematics of Constitutional Authority .................... 447
III. Accounts of Constitutional Authority................................................. 450

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss3/1

2016]

WHAT ARE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOR?

435

A. Authority by Consent ...................................................................... 450
B. Authority by Substance, Part I: Moral Content ............................... 453
C. Authority by Substance, Part II: Moral Guidance ........................... 456
D. Authority Through Procedure, Part I: Footnote Four ...................... 461
E. Authority Through Procedure, Part II: Bare Hobbesian Dispute
Resolution ............................................................................................ 466
IV. The Second Amendment and Footnote Four ...................................... 468
A. Heller and Footnote Four ................................................................ 468
B. Footnote Four and an Anti-“Tyranny” Second Amendment ........... 475
C. Footnote Four and a Structural Second Amendment ....................... 484
V. Conclusion: The Second Amendment and the Function
of Constitutional Rights ........................................................................... 488
A. Footnote Four as Jurisdictional Principle ........................................ 490
B. Authoritativeness as Interpretive Principle ...................................... 493
I. Introduction: The Second Amendment
and the Question of Constitutional Authority
District of Columbia v. Heller was the occasion for a momentous
national conversation that never happened. In that 2008 decision, the
Supreme Court held for the first time that the Second Amendment protects
an individual right to possess handguns for self-defense.1 Heller sparked
heated debates over the propriety of the Court’s originalist interpretive
methodology2 and the accuracy with which that methodology was applied.3
1. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
2. Critiques of originalism, focusing on Heller, include Saul Cornell, Originalism on
Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625,
626 (2008) (“Scalia’s decision demonstrates that . . . originalism is . . . a lawyer’s version of
a magician’s parlor trick . . . .”); Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO
ST. L.J. 609, 610 (2008) (arguing that Heller demonstrates that “the new originalism cannot
deliver on its promises” to remove judicial discretion from judging); and Richard A. Posner,
In Defense of Looseness, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 27, 2008), http://www.newrepublic.com/
article/books/defense-looseness (arguing that “[t]rue originalism licenses loose construction”
as opposed to Heller’s “narrow” methodology). Defenses of originalism focusing on Heller
include Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History: District of
Columbia v. Heller, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1377, 1378 (2009) (calling Justice Scalia’s Heller
opinion “carefully reasoned and scholarly”); Randy E. Barnett, News Flash: The
Constitution Means What It Says, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2008, at A13, http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB121452412614009067 (“Justice Scalia's opinion is exemplary . . . . [It] is the
finest example of . . . ‘original public meaning’ jurisprudence ever adopted by the Supreme
Court.”).
3. Many observers who do not themselves endorse originalism have asserted that the
Heller majority opinion was more consistent with evolving popular views than with the
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But virtually no one asked what should have been an obvious question:
Even if the Heller Court got the meaning of the Second Amendment right,
why should we obey that decision? Why, that is, should we obey the
Second Amendment?
That question should have been obvious because the Second
Amendment, unlike most rights-conferring provisions of our Constitution,
is controversial on its face. Most rights provisions engender dispute, not
because of what their text reveals, but because of what it hides. There is
nothing controversial, for instance, about the merits of protecting “life,
liberty, or property,” as the text of the Due Process Clauses clearly does.4 In
the abstract, everybody likes those values, and that is how they are
expressed in the text: in the abstract. Just about everyone similarly approves
(in the abstract) of “the freedom of speech” and “the free exercise” of
“religion” that are protected by the First Amendment,5 and of “the equal
protection of the laws” that is guaranteed by the Fourteenth.6 The
disagreement about these provisions centers not on what they clearly say,
but on how the Court has interpreted and applied them to particular
issues—on whether “liberty” includes a right to choose an abortion, for
example, or whether “the freedom of speech” prohibits regulation of
corporate-funded “issue ads” during an election.
The Second Amendment is different. The text of that Amendment reads,
“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”7
Whatever the import of the so-called “prefatory clause” invoking a
“Militia,”8 or the precise meaning of the term “the people,” the Amendment

original understanding. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular
Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008); Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551 (2009). Some pro-originalist commentators shared this basic
critique. See Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence,
56 UCLA L. REV. 1343 (2009). Others accused Heller of getting the history wrong, see
David C. Williams, Death to Tyrants: District of Columbia v. Heller and the Uses of Guns,
69 OHIO ST. L.J. 641 (2008), or of mangling the Second Amendment’s text, see Posner,
supra note 2. But some prominent figures of the so-called “New Originalism” movement
vigorously defended Heller’s methodology. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, District of
Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 940 (2009); Barnett, supra
note 2.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. Id. amend. I.
6. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. Id. amend. II.
8. This is what Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, called it in Heller. 554 U.S. at 595.
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clearly protects some instances of weapons possession from government
interference; it clearly limits in some way the government’s ability to
regulate firearms. A significant number of Americans, however, disagrees,
as a matter of policy or political morality, with the wisdom of protecting
any right to possess guns.9
The relative specificity of the right protected by the Second Amendment
thus renders the amendment almost innately controversial, regardless of
how it is interpreted. By way of analogy, imagine a constitutional provision
explicitly protecting “a woman’s right to abort a fetus she carries.” Surely
there would be interpretive controversy over the precise meaning and
application of the provision—whether it protects late-term abortions, for
example. But the controversy would not disappear if the Court somehow
magically struck upon the one true meaning of the text. Whatever the “right
to abort a fetus” means, it must mean at least that some fetuses can be
aborted without government interference. And that idea by itself would be
enough to anger a great many Americans.
Or consider a real-world (though now thankfully defunct) analogy: the
Fugitive Slave Clause, which gave to slave owners (parties to whom
“Service or Labour may be due”) a right to have escaped slaves (“Person[s]
held to Service or Labour”) “delivered up” upon the slave owner’s

9. Just how many Americans appears to be a difficult question to answer. Publicopinion surveys typically ask, not about objections to gun possession in the abstract, but
about support for particular gun regulations or, more generally, attitudes toward relatively
amorphous concepts like “gun control.” See, e.g., Growing Public Support for Gun Rights,
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/12/10/growingpublic-support-for-gun-rights/ (reporting results of survey asking, inter alia, whether
respondents think “it is more important . . . to protect the right of Americans to own guns,
[or] to control gun ownership”); see also Margie Omero et al., What the Public Really
Thinks About Guns, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 27, 2013), https://cdn.american
progress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/GunPolling-5.pdf (reporting overall trends in
recent attitudes on gun-related issues). Pre-Heller polls often asked about respondents’
understanding of the Second Amendment, which of course is not the same thing as asking
about their underlying moral views. See, e.g., Guns: CNN/Opinion Research Corp. Poll June
4-5, 2008, POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/guns2.htm (last visited Jan.
12, 2016) (asking whether respondents think the Amendment “guarantee[s] each person the
right to own a gun, or [rather] protect[s] the right of citizens to form a militia without
implying that each individual has the right to own a gun”); Guns: USA Today/Gallup Poll
Feb. 8-10, 2008, POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/guns2.htm (last
visited Jan. 12, 2016) (asking whether respondents “believe the Second Amendment . . .
guarantees the rights of Americans to own guns, or . . . only guarantees members of state
militias such as National Guard units the right to own guns”).
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“Claim.”10 The proper interpretation of the clause was a matter of
contention, to be sure.11 But it would have been difficult to read the clause
in a way that did not require “delivering up” at least some fugitive slaves—
and that in itself was sufficient to convince many Americans that the
Fugitive Slave Clause (perhaps even the Constitution as a whole) was
wicked.12
The Second Amendment thus brings front and center the question, not
merely of how the Court should interpret constitutional rights, but of why—
indeed whether—those rights ought to bind us at all. It is a strangely
underexplored question in American constitutional discourse. The debate
over the “countermajoritarian difficulty” of judicial review is so familiar as
to be wearisome;13 but that debate almost invariably focuses on the courts’
role in deciding constitutional issues, not on the question of why
democratically enacted policies ought to be trumped by centuries-old
constitutional provisions, however the courts may interpret them.14
The questions of whether, and why, constitutional rights bind us—of
whether (and why) we, the democratic majority, ought to obey them—are
questions about the authority of the Constitution. Authority is a nuanced
concept, as I explain in Part II, but its basic gist is this: if a command (say, a
constitutional provision) possesses authority, we are obligated to obey it
10. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
11. For example, in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842), the Court
interpreted the Fugitive Slave Clause broadly to override state requirements of judicial
process before alleged escaped slaves could be privately seized. The decision provoked
considerable resistance in the North, including new state laws like that in Massachusetts,
which barred the use of state employees or facilities to assist in “recapturing” alleged
fugitives. See 1 MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY 395 (3d ed.
2011).
12. Abolitionists such as William Lloyd Garrison and Wendell Phillips “condemned the
Constitution as a proslavery compact, which they called a ‘covenant with death’ and ‘an
agreement in Hell.’” UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 11, at 385.
13. For more on this point, see Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession:
The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002).
14. This, for instance, was the exclusive focus of the book by Alexander Bickel that
inducted the phrase “the countermajoritarian difficulty” into the lexicon. ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d
ed. 1986). Bickel set the terms of the debate in which American constitutional theorists have
been engaged ever since, and many of the most significant subsequent entries in that debate
also have attended to judicial review in particular rather than constitutionalism more
generally. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1-38 (1996).
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even if we disagree with it, and without regard to the possibility of
punishment for disobedience. If the command lacks authority, however, we
have no obligation to obey it; obedience to a nonauthoritative command is a
moral mistake. If the Second Amendment lacks legitimate authority, it
cannot bind Americans who disagree with its content.
And note that such a failure of authority would be problematic even if a
majority of Americans agrees with a given constitutional provision, as is
probably the case with the Second Amendment at the time of this writing.15
Constitutional disobedience need not be national in scope. A state or
municipality, for example, whose majority disapproves of a “right . . . to
keep and bear Arms”16 could enact laws infringing that right, in essence
thumbing its collective nose at the Second Amendment. A judge who
disapproves of the right could refuse to enjoin one of these state or local
laws. A relatively small group of congressmen opposed to the right could
block a federal legislative remedy against recalcitrant states and localities.
And so on.
The authority of constitutional provisions like the Second Amendment
therefore is an issue of considerable importance. The sources and merits of
the Constitution’s claim to authority, however, turn out to be remarkably
unclear. This Article uses the Second Amendment as a framework for
exploring the foundations of constitutional authority. Building on earlier
work, I examine the range of reasonable accounts of that authority, finding
most of them unconvincing. Most accounts of constitutional authority are
what I call substantive in nature: they require obedience to the Constitution
because of what the Constitution commands. I contend that the only
plausible justification of constitutional authority is not substantive in this
sense, but rather procedural: it requires obedience to the Constitution, not
because of what it commands, but because of how it commands us—that is,
because of the process by which constitutional commands are generated.
I then measure the Second Amendment against this procedural account
of constitutional authority. There are a number of ways to interpret the
Amendment that are reasonable in light of our interpretive traditions, but
most of these interpretations rest on one or more implausible substantive
theories of authority. This includes both the Heller “individual selfdefense” reading and the “anti-tyranny” reading that is common in popular
15. See, e.g., Omero et al., supra note 9, at 2 (“There is an emerging consensus on guns
among the American public. Most Americans agree that handguns should not be banned,
that more needs to be done to keep guns away from dangerous people, and that military-style
weapons don’t belong on the streets.”) (emphasis omitted).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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discourse.17 I argue that if these interpretations are correct, the Second
Amendment lacks authority over us; we have no moral obligation to obey
it. As an alternative to these problematic readings of the amendment, I point
to the interpretation advanced by Justice Stevens in his dissent in Heller,
which has at least a credible claim to consistency with a procedural account
of constitutional authority.18
My analysis, while hopefully interesting to participants in the Heller
debate, has significance well beyond the Second Amendment. First, it
provides markers that can be used to spot other problematic constitutional
provisions or interpretations and to avoid adding such provisions to our
Constitution in the future. For instance, the analysis suggests that the
Court’s “substantive due process” decisions—including its recognition of
an abortion right—rest on weak authoritative foundations. The Article thus
points toward a sort of jurisdictional principle of constitutionalism,
justifying constitutional rules that serve procedural functions but not those
that simply impose controversial substantive values on an otherwise
democratic process.
Second, the analysis suggests that considerations of constitutional
authority ought to play a role in constitutional interpretation—not just in the
development of general interpretive methodologies, as I’ve argued
elsewhere,19 but also in the interpretation of particular constitutional
provisions. A reasonable interpretation that makes sense of constitutional
authority—one that gives us a reason to obey the provision being
interpreted—is better than one that fails to do so, all else being equal.
II. What Is Constitutional Authority (and Why Should We Care)?
Constitutional authority is the central concept in this Article, and in this
part, I explain what it is and why it matters. I begin in Section A by
discussing the features of legal authority generally. In Section B, I describe
the need for a theory to explain whether, and how, legitimate authority can
exist. In Section C, I note the special dynamics of legal authority in the
context of constitutional law, and in Section D I suggest that these
dynamics make it particularly difficult to justify constitutional authority.

17. See infra note 140.
18. 554 U.S. 570, 636-78 (2008).
19. See Christopher J. Peters, What Lies Beneath: Interpretive Methodology,
Constitutional Authority, and the Case of Originalism, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1251 [hereinafter
Peters, What Lies Beneath].
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A. The Concept of Legal Authority
Law purports to have amazing powers. It purports to tell its subjects how
to behave, even when those subjects disagree with what the law
commands—indeed, as I’ll explain, even when the law is wrong—and even
when disobedience is unlikely to be detected. And of course it claims the
right to punish subjects whose disobedience is detected.
Law, in other words, claims authority. “Authority is the right to
command,” writes Robert Paul Wolff, “and correlatively, the right to be
obeyed.”20 Wolff himself argues that such a right does not exist,21 but let us
suppose for present purposes that it does. Assuming it exists, what does this
“right to be obeyed” entail?
(1) Normativity. First, it entails a right to be obeyed even in cases where
punishment for disobedience is unlikely. Consider the substance of most
legal commands: they purport to apply to everyone within their purview,
not just those who fear being punished for disobeying them. The obligation
to report one’s full income on one’s tax return, for example, applies to
every person required to file a return, not just to citizens likely to be tagged
for an IRS audit. Speed-limit signs on the highway do not read “65 mph
(except when no cops are around).” Clearly the authors of these laws intend
them to apply in all cases, including those many cases in which coercive
enforcement is unlikely.
This understanding about legal commands is not limited to lawmakers or
other legal officials; it is shared by those subject to law as well. As H.L.A.
Hart famously made clear, people who are subject to law typically perceive
an obligation to obey the law that does not depend on coercion.22 Hart
observed that our typical moral intuitions about legal commands differ from
our intuitions about orders backed up only by threats of force; while we
might feel “obliged” to hand over our money to an armed robber, we would
not think ourselves “under an obligation” to do so.23 In contrast, we have an
“obligation” to send money to the IRS by April 15. While the necessity of
obeying the gunman disappears as soon as the gunman (or the gun) is gone,
20. ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM 4 (rev. ed. 1998); see also Scott J.
Shapiro, Authority, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
382, 385-87 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) (describing Wolff’s views).
21. WOLFF, supra note 20.
22. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 82-91 (2d ed. 1994). Hart’s analytical
conclusion is supported by empirical research. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE
LAW 62-68 (2006) (reporting results of an empirical study suggesting that people often obey
the law because of “normative” beliefs in the law’s legitimacy).
23. HART, supra note 22, at 82-83.
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our obligation to pay our taxes exists, and persists, even if we are unlikely
to suffer punishment for failing to pay them. Our fortuitous evasion of an
audit, or our intentional fleeing of the jurisdiction to avoid payment, might
escape the coercion, but it does not erase the obligation.24
I will refer to this property of authority—its capacity to require
obedience even absent coercion—as normativity. In claiming a right to be
obeyed, law and other supposed authorities claim a normative power, the
power to create a certain kind of reason for action: a reason why one ought
to act in a certain way, regardless of whether one is being physically
coerced into doing so.
This is not to say that there is no relationship between legal authority and
coercion. It seems likely that the right to coerce obedience follows from the
existence of legal authority. As Larry Alexander and Emily Sherwin point
out, “[I]ndividuals will sometimes err in their [moral] calculations and
disobey [a legal] rule . . . when they believe that its prescription is wrong
for the circumstances in which they find themselves.”25 Coerced obedience
may be necessary to prevent people from acting on these moral
miscalculations. It may also be necessary to prevent people from
unjustifiably disobeying the law, not due to moral miscalculation, but
simply out of bad faith. In other words, if law imposes an obligation of
obedience, it may be appropriate to enforce that obligation by coercion.
But it is the obligation that licenses the coercion, not the coercion that
creates the obligation. If the power to coerce obedience were sufficient to
generate normativity—to create a moral obligation to obey—then there
would be no meaningful moral difference between the tax laws and the
demands of an armed robber. Evading taxes would then be the moral
equivalent of escaping a robbery. To the contrary, even when we cheat the
government we acknowledge that there is some moral cost in doing so. That
is the significance of the language of “cheating”—that we are doing
something at least a little wrong when we evade a command. As Wolff puts
it, “[W]ho would speak of ‘cheating’ a thief?”26
(2) Content-independence. An authority’s right to be obeyed also exists
regardless of the moral content of what the authority is commanding.
Authorities do not say “Obey this command provided it is the right thing to
do”; they say, simply, “Obey this command.” Authoritative commands thus
differ from arguments, which invite the audience to decide for themselves
24. Id. at 83-84.
25. LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES, &
THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 54 (2001).
26. WOLFF, supra note 20, at 4.
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how best to act, with the argument as a prod or a guide. “[Arguments]
attempt to convince the person that they ought to act in certain ways . . . .
Commands, on the other hand, are not designed to convince their
addressees of the wisdom of their contents.”27 Commands demand
obedience, not moral contemplation. “To obey a command is to perform the
act commanded for the reason that it was commanded.”28
To obey a command “for the reason that it was commanded” is
necessarily to obey that command without regard to its moral content.29
Driving no faster than sixty-five miles per hour might be the correct thing
to do in a particular circumstance, morally speaking, or it might be
incorrect. Morality, properly considered, might permit driving as fast as
(say) seventy-five in a given circumstance, despite the existence of a sixtyfive-miles-per-hour speed limit. But the driver who obeys the speed limit
does not stop to consider this question before doing so. If she decides to
drive sixty-five because she thinks that is the morally best speed, all things
considered, then she is not really obeying the speed-limit law; she is
obeying the dictates of morality, which happen in this case to coincide with
the law’s command (or so she believes). And if she decides to drive
seventy-five because she thinks that is the morally proper speed, then
clearly she is not obeying the law even in a superficial sense.
True obedience precludes an all-things-considered moral judgment. And
so our reason to obey the law or some other authoritative command must be
something other than the command’s consistency with morality. Legal
philosophers refer to this requirement as one of content-independence: the
duty to obey an authority must be independent of the moral content of the
authority’s commands. 30
In fact this requirement is simply an entailment of the property of
normativity discussed above. In order for a command to impose a moral
reason for action, it must change the calculus of moral reasons that would
exist without the command; it must introduce to that calculus a new reason
for action. The fact that a command is consistent with what morality
already requires is not a new reason; people already have sufficient reason
to do what morality requires. Normativity entails some additional reason to
obey a command, independent of its consistency with the demands of
morality.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Shapiro, supra note 20, at 386.
Id. (emphasis added).
See id.
See H.L.A. HART, Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in ESSAYS
BENTHAM 253-55 (1982); Shapiro, supra note 20, at 389.
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(3) Special moral force or moral status. Finally, the right to be obeyed
entails that the content-independent moral reason or reasons for obedience
be stronger than, or have a superior status to, ordinary reasons for action.
This property is inherent in the notion of a right to be obeyed, and in the
correlative notion of a duty or obligation to obey. A duty or obligation is
greater than a mere reason to act.
Compare law in this respect to other examples of actions taken in
response to someone’s “order” or request. It is common to speak of
“doctor’s orders,” for example, so suppose a doctor counsels her patient to
avoid high-cholesterol foods. The patient might be strongly inclined to
follow the doctor’s advice, since the doctor is, relative to the patient, an
expert (an “authority”) on matters of health. Except in unusual
circumstances, however, the patient wouldn’t consider himself morally
obligated to follow the doctor’s advice. Instead, the patient would treat that
advice as simply another reason—albeit perhaps an especially weighty
one—for taking a certain action. Sometimes that reason might be
outweighed by countervailing reasons, as when the patient, celebrating his
wedding anniversary at an expensive restaurant, decides that the occasion
warrants ordering the filet mignon rather than the salad.
A legal command differs in this sense from the “order” (really the
advice) of a doctor. A command is not presented by the person issuing it, or
understood by those subject to it, as simply one among many reasons for
action, to be weighed against competing reasons. Of course commands—
legal rules, for example—may have exceptions, but those exceptions are
themselves products of commands (e.g., the legal rule recognizing selfdefense as an exception to the legal rule prohibiting murder). Where no
legal exception applies, legal officials expect obedience to the law, not just
due consideration of whether to obey as part of an all-things-considered
judgment about what to do.
The question of what exactly is morally distinctive about an authoritative
rule or command is controversial among legal philosophers. Some argue
that authoritative commands take on a special status in our moral reasoning:
they preempt or supplant other moral reasons for action, requiring us to act
based on the command rather than on the full panoply of otherwise relevant
reasons.31 Others contend that authoritative commands exert special force in
our moral reasoning—creating a moral presumption, perhaps, that might be

31. See, e.g., ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 25, at 4, 11-17, 26-34, 55-61; JOSEPH
RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 57-62 (1986). See generally Shapiro, supra note 20, at
404-05.
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overcome by countervailing factors.32 We can remain agnostic about these
debates for purposes of this Article. The important thing to note is that the
concept of authority presupposes more than just an everyday reason for
obedience. It supposes a reason on the order of an obligation or duty, one
that cannot simply be weighted on an equal basis with other moral reasons
for action.
At the same time, it is important to acknowledge the limits of a “right to
be obeyed” and a corresponding obligation to obey. It is implausible that
the right and the corresponding obligation are absolute. The right and the
obligation must be defeasible; they must be capable of being outweighed by
competing considerations in certain circumstances, even if those
circumstances are rare. Otherwise there would be no such thing as justified
disobedience to valid law. We recognize that disobedience sometimes is
justified, even when the law being disobeyed is valid. Exceeding the posted
speed limit, for example, might be the right thing to do, morally speaking, if
the driver is rushing a severely injured person to the hospital. This does not
mean the speed-limit law is invalid; it means only that there are
circumstances in which morality permits (perhaps even requires)
disobedience to the law despite its validity.
We should keep this point in mind in discussing constitutional authority:
even a constitutional provision that is validly authoritative might on
occasion be subject to justified disobedience. This, in essence, was
Abraham Lincoln’s position in defense of his unilateral suspension of
habeas corpus in the early days of the Civil War.33 Lincoln told Congress,
not that the Suspension Clause lacked authority under those circumstances,
but rather that disobeying it was justified despite its authority, lest “all the
laws[,] but one[,] go unexecuted.”34
B. Legitimate Authority
Authority—the right to be obeyed—therefore is the conjunction of the
properties of normativity, content-independence, and special (but not
absolute) moral force or status. In shorthand, a command possesses
32. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 202-05 (1991);
Stephen R. Perry, Second-Order Reasons, Uncertainty and Legal Theory, 62 S. CAL. L. REV.
913, 966 (1989); Donald H. Regan, Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz’s Morality of
Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 995, 1003-13 (1989).
33. See UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 11, at 459-63.
34. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 594, 601 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1946).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016

446

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:433

authority if it imposes a defeasible content-independent moral obligation to
act as the command directs.
Of course, a person or institution might claim authority for its commands
but do so unjustifiably: its commands might not in fact impose a defeasible
content-independent moral obligation to act. This is possible even if those
subject to the commands generally believe they are authoritative. De facto
authority might exist without legitimate, or de jure, authority.35 Where this
is the case, those subject to the supposed authority are committing a moral
error, perhaps a quite serious one: they are obeying another’s commands
without justification for doing so.
Some have argued that there is no such thing as de jure, or legitimate,
authority.36 Others have argued, somewhat more modestly, that law cannot
possess legitimate authority, at least not in a general sense.37 To defeat
these arguments, it would be necessary to articulate an account of legal
authority that justifies law’s typical imposition of the kind of duty described
in the previous section. An account of legitimate legal authority requires a
justification of a general content-independent moral obligation (albeit only
a defeasible one) to obey legal commands.38
An account of constitutional authority—the subject of this Article—need
not be quite so ambitious, although it may prove at least as difficult. Such
an account need only justify the capacity of constitutional law (not law
generally) to impose a defeasible content-independent moral obligation to
act. If such an account is successful, then it can mark out the terms on
which constitutional authority is legitimate—the circumstances in which
those subject to a constitution have a duty to obey it, and in which they may
be punished for failing to do so. If an account of constitutional authority is
not successful, then obedience to a constitution according to the terms of
that account, and enforcement of that obedience, are unjustified. And if no
plausible account of constitutional authority is available, then constitutional
obedience and constitutional enforcement are unjustified, full stop. Without
constitutional authority, our practice of obeying the Constitution’s
commands would be a moral mistake.

35. See WOLFF, supra note 20, at 10; see also Shapiro, supra note 20, at 386.
36. See, e.g., WOLFF, supra note 20, at 10.
37. See, e.g., ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF
AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2012).
38. I have attempted such an account elsewhere. See generally CHRISTOPHER J. PETERS,
A MATTER OF DISPUTE: MORALITY, LAW, AND DEMOCRACY (2011) [hereinafter PETERS,
MATTER OF DISPUTE].

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss3/1

2016]

WHAT ARE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOR?

447

C. The Particular Dynamics of Constitutional Authority
That mistake, moreover, would be a serious one indeed, because it would
entail the unjustified impairment of the democratic process. In most
instances, those subject to the supposed authority of the United States
Constitution are government decision makers, not private actors.39
Constitutional law tells government officials what they must, may, and may
not do; it applies to legislators, executive-branch officials, judges, and other
government agents acting in their capacity as officials of government.
Constitutional law also applies to individual citizens qua citizens: by
limiting what their government may do, it limits what citizens can
accomplish with their votes and political expression. Most of American
constitutional law does not, however, apply to persons in their capacities as
private actors. To put things in Hartian terms, constitutional law consists
mostly of “secondary rules,” rules that are “about” the primary rules of
conduct in the system—about how to create the primary rules, how to
change them, and what their content can be.40
Constitutional commands therefore demand the obedience of participants
in the everyday democratic process. For those commands to possess
legitimate authority, they must be capable of imposing a defeasible contentindependent obligation upon the democratic majority and its political
representatives—capable, that is, of constraining ordinary democracy.
D. The Special Problematics of Constitutional Authority
In his provocative book On Constitutional Disobedience, Louis Michael
Seidman argues that the United States Constitution lacks legitimate
authority.41 The Constitution, Seidman contends, is a “deeply flawed,
eighteenth-century document[.]”42 Yet it purports to limit what “We the
People” (“the actual people of the here and now,” in the words of another
constitutional theorist, Alexander Bickel43) can decide through democratic
39. The current exceptions are the first clause of Section 3 of Article III, which defines
the crime of treason, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, and Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment,
which prohibits “slavery or involuntary servitude” even when practiced by private actors,
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. The historical exception was the Eighteenth Amendment,
which prohibited “the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors” regardless
of who was doing the manufacturing, selling, or transporting. Id. amend. XVIII, § 1
(repealed 1933).
40. HART, supra note 22, at 94.
41. LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE (2012).
42. Id. at 4.
43. BICKEL, supra note 14, at 17.
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processes. “[W]ho in their right mind” would accept such a limitation?
Seidman asks.44 Seidman addresses and rejects a litany of arguments in
favor of constitutional authority, including the contention that “anarchy or
tyranny” would result from constitutional disobedience.45 “Other
successful, nonanarchic, and nontyrannical countries like the United
Kingdom and New Zealand seem to do just fine without a written
Constitution,” he points out.46
Seidman’s argument might sound radical, but in fact it is just a recent
volley in a long-running skirmish over the legitimacy of constitutional
authority. For as long as American courts have been declaring government
actions “unconstitutional,” people have argued that the supposed authority
behind these acts of judicial review does not really exist.47 Typically these
objections have been directed at the practice of judicial review (courts’
invalidation of political decisions, or refusal to enforce them, on
constitutional grounds),48 although some recent critiques have focused more
broadly on constitutional law itself, or on particularly salient aspects of
constitutional law such as bills of rights.49 Like Seidman, these historical
critics typically have lamented the supposedly “countermajoritarian” (that
is, antidemocratic) impact of constitutional law.50 In advocating
disobedience to the Constitution rather than (say) mere curtailment of
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

SEIDMAN, supra note 41, at 7.
Id. at 18 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
See Friedman, supra note 13, at 172-215.
See, e.g., LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
LECTURES (1958); James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). But see DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 1-38,
332-47 (defending judicial review against many of these critiques); JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (same); BICKEL, supra
note 14 (same).
49. See, e.g., JAMES ALLAN, THE VANTAGE OF LAW: ITS ROLE IN THINKING ABOUT LAW,
JUDGING AND BILLS OF RIGHTS (2011); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 211312 (1999) [hereinafter WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT]; Jeremy Waldron, The Core of
the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1380-82 (2006) [hereinafter
Waldron, Against Judicial Review]. Despite the title of Waldron’s article, it is in fact at least
as much an attack on codified constitutional rights as on judicial review as a method of
interpreting and enforcing them.
50. Alexander Bickel coined the term “The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty” to describe
the tension between judicially enforced constitutional norms and the principles of
democracy. See BICKEL, supra note 14, at 16. The term has since become commonplace,
though it usually is rendered without Bickel’s hyphen. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 13, at
13.
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judicial review, Seidman has simply pushed these critiques to their logical
conclusion.
Seidman also makes explicit what has typically been an unstated premise
of these critiques: that ordinary democratic processes are fully capable of
performing most or all of the functions of law without the need for a
judicially enforceable constitution.51 We can imagine a number of purposes
that might justify law in general, such as inducing morally correct action,
resolving costly disputes, and solving coordination problems. In essence,
Seidman and these other critics ask why we can’t just rely on everyday
democratic lawmaking to serve these aims. As Seidman points out, it seems
unlikely that anarchy or tyranny would immediately result if we stopped
obeying the Constitution; subconstitutional law could simply pick up the
slack.52 This, after all, is what happens in liberal democracies without
written constitutions, like Great Britain.
These critics thus question the benefits of constitutional law. And, on the
other side of the equation, they emphasize its rather troubling costs in the
coin of democracy. When the “eighteenth-century” Constitution was
ratified, “[n]o women, African Americans, or Indians and few individuals
without property were allowed to cast votes.”53 Worse, “[N]o one alive
today had anything to do with the ratification process. As Thomas Jefferson
famously insisted, the world belongs to the living.”54 Constraining the
capacity for self-government of today’s democratic majority, as
constitutional law clearly does, thus seems deeply contrary to democratic
principles. There had better be significant benefits to outweigh these costs.
Seidman’s critique therefore underscores the special challenges that a
defense of constitutional authority must overcome. It is not enough to
develop a compelling account of why law in general ought to compel
obedience. Defenders of constitutional authority must go further; they must
explain why democratically enacted law should be subject to the
supposedly superior authority of an eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
Constitution.

51. Jeremy Waldron also has endorsed this premise explicitly, and indeed has defended
it at length. See WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 49, at 21-146; Waldron,
Against Judicial Review, supra note 49, at 1361-62.
52. SEIDMAN, supra note 41, at 18.
53. Id. at 6-7. Seidman is not quite correct about this; some free African Americans, and
a few women, could vote at the time the Constitution was adopted. See infra note 72 and
accompanying text.
54. SEIDMAN, supra note 41, at 7.
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III. Accounts of Constitutional Authority
Can the challenge of justifying constitutional authority be met? Drawing
on my previous work,55 in this part I examine five competing accounts of
constitutional authority, each of which has prominent contemporary or
historical adherents. Four of these accounts, I argue, are implausible. The
lone plausible account follows the lines sketched by the Court in Carolene
Products Footnote Four and subsequently shaded in by John Hart Ely. In
Part IV, I superimpose this account on the Second Amendment, suggesting
that it can justify neither Heller nor most other reasonable interpretations of
the “right . . . to keep and bear Arms.”56
A. Authority by Consent
A common way to justify the authority of the Constitution is to claim we
have consented to obey it.57 These “Consensualist” accounts make intuitive
sense: individuals sometimes consent to do something they otherwise
would not be required to do (babysit a friend’s child, donate money to
charity, submit renovation plans to a homeowners’ association board), and
that consent might give them a powerful moral reason (maybe even an
obligation) to do the thing to which they have consented. If individuals can
create obligations through consent—including obligations to obey an
authority (think of the homeowners’ association example)—perhaps
societies can too. Contractarian theories of political obligation, from Locke
to Rawls, are built on this basic premise,58 as are contemporary “popular
sovereignty” accounts of constitutional law.59
55. The previous scholarship is PETERS, MATTER OF DISPUTE, supra note 38; Peters,
What Lies Beneath, supra note 19; and Christopher J. Peters, Originalism, Stare Decisis, and
Constitutional Authority, in PRECEDENT IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 189
(Christopher J. Peters ed., 2014) [hereinafter Peters, Originalism].
56. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
57. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 395 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed.,
2009) (ascribing constitutional authority to a “solemn and authoritative act” by “the
people”); Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution (Oct. 21, 1986) (speech at Tulane
University), in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 99, 102 (Steven G. Calbresi
ed., 2007) (describing the Constitution as “the instrument by which the consent of the
governed—the fundamental requirement of any legitimate government—is transformed into
a government”).
58. See JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 388-94
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1689); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
11-17 (1971). There are of course complexities here, many arising from the fact that Rawls’s
theory (explicitly) and Locke’s theory (implicitly) rely, not on actual consent, but on
hypothetical or constructive consent. It is far from clear that constructive-consent theories
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Consent conceivably might generate the three aspects of authority
discussed in Section II.A: normativity, content-independence, and special
moral force or status. The fact that we have consented to do something
might supply a reason for us to do that thing quite apart from the threat of
punishment for not doing it. The fact of our consent also clearly is a
content-independent reason for us to act. However distasteful we might
now find the requirements of, say, the Second Amendment, our consent to
obey the amendment—if in fact we have given it—provides us with a
reason to obey its command. It seems possible, moreover, that this reason
would have special force or status: it might rise to the level of an obligation
or duty, not just an ordinary reason for action.
While consent might justify the authority of some imaginable
constitution, however, it cannot justify the authority of our Constitution.
One cannot consent to something if one has not been given the opportunity
to say “no,”60 and one cannot be deemed to have consented if one has been
given the opportunity to say “no” and has in fact done so. The conjunction
of these facts raises two insurmountable obstacles for Consensualist
theories of American constitutional authority.
The first obstacle is that consent to our Constitution was far from
unanimous even at the time the relevant provisions were adopted.61 As
Seidman points out, a great many Americans at the time of the original
Framing—women, people of African descent, many who did not own
property—were excluded from the process of ratifying those provisions.62
can find traction in the normative mechanics of actual consent. See PETERS, MATTER OF
DISPUTE, supra note 38, at 52-57. Yet it is the intuitive and experiential force of actual
consent that lends appeal to these constructive-consent theories.
59. E.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 127-52 (1999); Kurt T. Lash,
Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1444-53
(2007).
60. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 16 (2004) (“Just as I can say, ‘I consent,’ there must also be a way to say, ‘I do not
consent.’”).
61. See id. at 20 (“The Constitution was not approved by a unanimous vote, nor even by
a majority of all persons living in the country at the time. . . . How can a small minority of
inhabitants presuming to call themselves ‘We the People’ consensually bind anyone but
themselves?”).
62. Women were not allowed to vote in any state at the time of the Framing, with the
minor exception of New Jersey, which “apparently did allow a few propertied widows to
vote.” AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 19 (2005). Slaves could
not vote in any state at that time, see id., and free blacks could not vote in Georgia, South
Carolina, and Virginia, see ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED
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These Americans were not even given the opportunity to consent (or to
withhold consent) to the Constitution by which they subsequently were
bound. The same is true, albeit to a somewhat lesser extent, of the framing
of the Reconstruction Amendments.63 Moreover, many of those who were
included in these processes actually opposed ratification.64 It is difficult to
see how these excluded or dissenting Americans somehow “consented” to
be bound by the Constitution’s provisions.
Even if this problem of contemporaneous nonconsent could be
overcome, Consensualist accounts face a second fatal obstacle: the
Americans of today are not the Americans of the Framing generations.65 No
one alive today was alive when the original Constitution, the Bill of Rights,
or the Reconstruction Amendments were adopted, meaning that no
American alive today actually consented to the ratification of those
provisions. And while it is true that some Americans alive today have
consented to obey the Constitution—naturalized citizens have done so,66 as
have government officials67—this is a small minority of the citizenry.
Because the American voting public is the ultimate subject of constitutional
constraint, all of us who are members of that voting public would have to
HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 328-29 tbl.A.1 (2000). Eleven of the
thirteen states required ownership of property in order to vote at the time they ratified the
Constitution. See id. Akhil Amar notes, however, that eight of these states suspended or
liberalized their property requirements for purposes of electing delegates to their ratifying
conventions. See AMAR, supra, at 7.
63. Racial restrictions on the franchise actually tightened between the Founding and the
Civil War, such that in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, free blacks
could vote in only eight of the thirty-three states. See KEYSSAR, supra note 62, at 53-60, 8789. Most property requirements had disappeared by the Civil War, see id. at 352-56 tbl.A.9
(showing only three states with property requirements as of 1855), but women still could not
vote in any state at that time, see id. at 172-83.
64. See UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 11, at 121-28 (describing the contentious
process of ratifying the original Constitution); id. at 47-76 (describing ratification of the
Thirteenth Amendment by provisional Reconstruction legislatures in the South); id. at 50204 (noting that ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment was in effect coerced by requiring
it for readmission to the Union).
65. See BARNETT, supra note 60, at 20 (“[A]ssuming [those who voted for the
Constitution] could somehow bind everyone then alive, how could they bind, by their
consent, their posterity?”).
66. See 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (2012) (“A person who has applied for naturalization shall,
in order to be . . . admitted to citizenship, take in a public ceremony before the Attorney
General or a court with jurisdiction . . . an oath . . . to support the Constitution of the United
States . . . .”).
67. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (requiring that all federal and state legislators, judges,
and officials “be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution”).
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have given our consent to be bound in order for a Consensualist account to
justify constitutional authority. Relatively few of us have done so.
Consensualist accounts of constitutional authority are rhetorically
appealing, drawing as they do on strong intuitions and a tradition of
statesmanship that includes figures like Abraham Lincoln.68 And, if all
Americans unanimously and freely consented to be bound by the
Constitution tomorrow, consent might work to justify its authority over
us—until the next generation of Americans, not having consented, assumed
their roles as citizens. But such an act of unanimous, contemporaneous
consent has never occurred in our country and almost certainly never will.
It is a chimera in any large, diverse society, and without it the moral power
of consent cannot justify constitutional authority.
B. Authority by Substance, Part I: Moral Content
Some theorists, most prominently Randy Barnett,69 have been convinced
by the failure of Consensualist theories to adopt what I will call a “Moral
Content” account of constitutional authority.70 On a Moral Content account,
the Constitution is authoritative because its provisions are, in essence,
substantively good ones;71 our obligation to obey the Second Amendment
(or any other constitutional provision) stems simply from the fact that the
provision tells us the right thing to do. On this view, morality or justice
requires us to respect the right to keep and bear arms, and for that reason we
should obey the amendment’s command to that effect.
Moral Content accounts fail as accounts of constitutional authority for a
straightforward reason: they vitiate the element of content-independence
that is a necessary ingredient of authority. On a Moral Content account, our
supposed reason to obey a constitutional command is that it is a
substantively good command. But this makes our supposed obligation to
68. See Abraham Lincoln, The Repeal of the Missouri Compromise and the Propriety of
Its Restoration: Speech at Peoria, Illinois, in Reply to Senator Douglas (Oct. 15, 1854), in
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, supra note 34, at 283, 304 (identifying
“the sheet anchor of American republicanism” as the principle “that no man is good enough
to govern another man, without that other’s consent”).
69. See BARNETT, supra note 60, at 4, 32-86 (outlining a theory of constitutional
“legitimacy” according to which, “if a constitution contains adequate procedures to
protect . . . natural rights, it can be legitimate even if it was not consented to by everyone”).
For a more extensive analysis and critique of Barnett’s account of constitutional authority,
see Peters, What Lies Beneath, supra note 19, at 1266-73.
70. Elsewhere, for reasons evident from the context, I have referred to this as a “Values
Imposition” account. See Peters, What Lies Beneath, supra note 19, at 1272.
71. See BARNETT, supra note 60, at 4.
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obey contingent entirely on the moral status of what the law requires. If
respecting the right to keep and bear arms is the morally correct thing to do,
then our obligation to do that thing flows entirely from the commands of
morality and not at all from the Second Amendment; the legal command
embodied in the amendment is superfluous. On the other hand, if respecting
the right to keep and bear arms is not the morally correct thing to do, then
we have no obligation to do it, despite the fact that the Second Amendment
commands us to; the legal command embodied in the amendment is
impotent.72
Of course, the requirements of morality are not transparent, and so we
can never know for certain whether, in any given circumstance, morality or
justice requires us to respect the right to keep and bear arms. We might then
decide to obey the Second Amendment as a way to dispel our uncertainty or
resolve our disagreement about what to do. Note, however, that if we obey
the Constitution as a way to resolve uncertainty or disagreement, we are not
obeying it because its commands are good or correct; we are obeying it
precisely because we do not know whether its commands are good or
correct. This is an altogether different sort of reason to obey the
Constitution—an example either of the “Moral Guidance” rationales that I
discuss in the next section or of the procedural accounts that I examine in
Section III.D.
As a practical matter, the content-dependence of Moral Content accounts
bares its teeth whenever we disagree with—or about—the substance of
what the Constitution commands. If we believe that morality or justice
requires us, in a given circumstance, to deny the right to keep and bear
arms, a Moral Content account gives us no reason to obey the Second
Amendment. On these accounts, the only reason to obey the Constitution is
that it is correct, morally speaking, and if we deny that the Constitution is
morally correct, we perceive no reason to obey it. Perhaps worse, if some of
us believe the Constitution is morally correct and others deny this, then we
will disagree, not just about morality, but about legal authority—about
whether the law is worthy of our obedience. Law must be capable of
quieting disagreements; it must operate, in Jeremy Waldron’s words, as “a
decision-procedure whose operation will settle, not reignite, the
controversies whose existence called for a decision-procedure in the first

72. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 20, at 383 (describing the “challenge posed” by those who
deny the existence of legitimate authority: “when authorities are wrong, they cannot have the
power to obligate others—when they are right, their power to obligate is meaningless. . . .
[T]he institution of authority is either pernicious or otiose.”).
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place.”73 Law cannot serve this function if its perceived authority extends
only so far as the perceived moral content of its commands.
What explains the appeal of Moral Content accounts if they are so
saliently deficient as accounts of legal authority? I suspect that, as with
Consensualist accounts, untested intuition is the culprit. As I discussed in
Section II.A.3, law cannot legitimately force us to do the morally wrong
thing; our ultimate obligation is to morality. And yet we speak and act in
terms of an “obligation” to “obey” the law. These two senses of
“obligation” seem to tug in opposite directions, and the easy way to
reconcile them is to equate them, by imagining that we are obligated to
obey the law because (and thus only to the extent that) it is consistent with
morality.
This intuitive equation rests on two fallacies. The first is an assumption
that a legal obligation must be morally absolute. If the existence of a legal
obligation implies an absolute moral duty, then law’s content cannot be
inconsistent with morality. As I discussed in Section II.A.3, however, it is
highly implausible that legal obligations are morally absolute. When we
speak of a legal “obligation,” we use the language of obligation to connote
the normativity and special moral force or status of law: our reasons to obey
the law exist independently of the threat of force, and they are stronger than
(or different in kind from) ordinary reasons for action. But the language of
legal obligation leaves open the possibility that, in any given case, the
demands of morality will outweigh those of authoritative law. Once we
recognize this possibility, the logical necessity that law be coextensive with
morality disappears.
The second fallacy is the failure to distinguish between the demands of
morality and our fallible human beliefs about those demands. Law cannot
give us a reason to act in a way that is inconsistent with the demands of
morality. But it can give us a reason to act in a way that we believe is
inconsistent with the demands of morality. One way to understand accounts
of legal authority is to see them as attempts to explain the nature of this
reason. Moral Content accounts necessarily fail at this attempt, because
they do not even make the attempt. They simply equate a duty of obedience
with the demands of morality, ignoring altogether our inherent uncertainty
about what the demands of morality really are.
Despite their intuitive appeal, then, Moral Content accounts cannot
justify an obligation actually to obey constitutional law (that is,

73. Waldron, Against Judicial Review, supra note 51, at 1371.
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constitutional authority). All they can do is transplant our uncertainty and
disagreement from the realm of morality to the realm of constitutional law.
C. Authority by Substance, Part II: Moral Guidance
Still, the intuitive pull of authority-by-substance persists. What can
justify legal authority, if not the idea that we will do better, morally
speaking, to obey the law than to disobey it? This insistent notion gives rise
to a family of more-sophisticated versions of a substantive account, which I
have called “Moral Guidance” accounts of legal authority.74
According to a Moral Guidance account, the authority of constitutional
(and other types of) law rests, not directly on the content of that law as on
Moral Content accounts, but rather on the moral judgment of the
lawmakers. As applied to constitutional law, a Moral Guidance account
holds that there is something special about the process of framing or
applying a constitution, something that makes the results of that process
more likely, on the whole, to be good or just than the results of ordinary
democratic politics. We therefore should obey constitutional law, on this
account, not because its provisions are sound in every instance, but rather
because its provisions are more likely to be sound than the alternatives we
could produce using ordinary politics. Even if we think the Second
Amendment is pernicious, we still have a strong reason to obey it on the
Moral Guidance account—namely that we are likely to be wrong that it is
pernicious, while the Framers were likely to be correct that it is not.
Note that Moral Guidance accounts seem to avoid the contentdependence problem that dooms straight-up Moral Content accounts. Our
reason to obey the Constitution (on these accounts) is not that the
Constitution is substantively just. Our reason, rather, is that the Constitution
is more likely to be substantively just than the alternatives. Moral Content
accounts ignore the fact of our uncertainty about what morality requires, but
Moral Guidance accounts leverage that fact. They tell us that in the face of
our moral uncertainty, we will do better, morally speaking, to obey the
Constitution than to follow our own fallible moral judgments. As such, they
offer us a content-independent reason to obey the Constitution even when
we disagree with it, which is something Moral Content accounts cannot
offer.

74. See Peters, What Lies Beneath, supra note 19, at 1297-1313; see also PETERS,
MATTER OF DISPUTE, supra note 38, at 39-48 (describing and critiquing such an account—
using the term “Epistemic-Guidance account”—as applied to legal authority generally).
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As general theories of legal authority, Moral Guidance accounts go back
at least to Plato75 and find their best-developed contemporary expression in
the work of Joseph Raz.76 In American constitutional theory, they appear in
a variety of forms in the writings of Alexander Hamilton,77 Alexander
Bickel,78 and Bruce Ackerman,79 among others.80 But they suffer from three
important types of flaws—contingent, conceptual, and functional—which
in combination doom them.
The contingent flaw is that Moral Guidance accounts, as applied to the
American Constitution, depend on a premise of relative moral wisdom that
is exceedingly vulnerable, to say the least. The crux of these accounts,
again, is that we ought to obey the Constitution even when we disagree with
its commands, because the process of generating those commands was
morally wiser than we are. But it is implausible that the actual Framing
processes were morally wiser than we are to the extent required to validate
the account.
The Framings were arbitrarily exclusionary, as we’ve seen,81 which gives
us double reason to question their moral wisdom. Substantively speaking,
excluding women, people of color, and those without property from the
ratification process was a clear moral error. Procedurally speaking, their
exclusion compromises the deliberative and participatory qualities that
75. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC & THE STATESMAN 129-60 (Henry Davis trans., M.
Walter Dunne 1901) (proposing a state ruled by wise and virtuous “guardians”).
76. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 21-105 (1986); see also Shapiro,
supra note 20, at 402-08 (describing Raz’s theory of legal authority).
77. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 57, at 395 (Alexander Hamilton)
(distinguishing the “solemn and authoritative act” of constitutional framing from the “ill
humors” and “momentary inclination[s]” of ordinary politics); see also Peters, What Lies
Beneath, supra note 19, at 1299 (interpreting Federalist No. 78 in Moral Guidance terms).
78. See BICKEL, supra note 14, at 23-28 (suggesting that judicial review might be
justified because “courts have certain capacities for dealing with matters of principle that
legislatures and executives do not possess”); see also Peters, What Lies Beneath, supra note
19, at 1302 (interpreting Bickel’s theory as a type of Moral Guidance account).
79. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 3-162 (1991); see also
Peters, What Lies Beneath, supra note 19, at 1299-1300 (interpreting Ackerman’s theory as a
type of Moral Guidance account).
80. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good
Constitution, 98 GEO. L.J. 1693 (2010); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A
Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 383 (2007); John O. McGinnis &
Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 803
(2009); see also Peters, What Lies Beneath, supra note 19, at 1300-01 (describing the
McGinnis/Rappaport theory and classifying it as a type of Moral Guidance account).
81. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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otherwise might justify trust in the results of the process. The fact that those
results themselves included at least one salient and grave injustice—the
preservation of slavery82—underscores the unlikelihood that the Framing
(the original one at least) can live up to the demands imposed upon it by a
Moral Guidance account.
The Second Amendment is illustrative in this regard. Gun policy is a
morass of competing costs, benefits, values, and interests, many of them
dependent on empirical analysis. Why should we think a collection of
propertied white men in 1791 were better suited to decide these issues than
we (the majority of the American people, acting through the democratic
process) are today? Here I want to put aside for the moment the obvious
fact that society has changed vastly and unpredictably in the ensuing twoand-a-quarter centuries; I will discuss that point below. Even without that
factor, it is implausible that the eighteenth-century Framing process, with
all its warts, was so much more morally reliable than today’s democratic
process, with all its warts, that the latter ought to reflexively defer to the
former’s judgments on gun policy.
This flaw is contingent because it is not an inevitable feature of every
constitutional system. One can imagine a constitutional process that is so
good, an ordinary democratic process that is so bad, or a sufficient
combination of both that it would be rational for democracy always to defer
to the superior wisdom of constitution making. Indeed, if Americans were
to convene a broadly inclusive, meaningfully participatory, deeply
deliberative constitutional convention tomorrow, the result might be worthy
of our deference on Moral Guidance grounds. But would those results
justify obedience by Americans twenty-five, fifty, or a hundred years from
now? I am not so sure, and the answer from a believer in moral progress
almost certainly would be no.
This last point hints at what I think is an even more critical flaw in Moral
Guidance accounts—a conceptual flaw that gets worse as a constitution
gets older. The premise of superior moral expertise is an “all else being
equal” premise: it weakens with every obvious procedural disadvantage of
the framing as compared to contemporary democracy. And one such
82. By means of the Three-Fifths Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, repealed by id.
amend. XIV, § 2, which counted slaves as three-fifths of a person for purposes of
congressional representation and direct taxation, thus giving the slave states additional
undeserved power in Congress; the Slave Trade Clause, id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1, which prohibited
Congress from banning the importation of slaves until 1808; and the Fugitive Slave Clause,
id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, superseded by id. amend. XIII, which required authorities in free states
to return escaped slaves to their owners on demand.
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procedural disadvantage, an inevitable one, is that contemporary democracy
will have a contextual understanding of constitutional problems that the
framers did not have.
The Framers of the Second Amendment surely grasped (for example) the
existence of a basic tension between the dangers to public safety posed by
guns and the dangers prevented by them. But they could not have
understood—could not even have imagined—the particular dynamics of
that tension in the context of twenty-first-century America, with its
semiautomatic weapons and high-capacity magazines, its powerful gun
industry, its NRA, its Brady Campaign, its drug wars, its recent and
ongoing history of mass killings, its deeply entrenched two-party system,
and so on. Americans today have a much better contextual view of these
contemporary dynamics than the eighteenth-century Framers could have
had; in a very real sense, the issue of whether and how to regulate guns is a
different issue now than it was in 1791 or in 1868. The same point could be
made about almost any constitutional provision: the Free Speech Clause83
in the age of the Internet, the Fourth Amendment’s84 prohibition on
“unreasonable searches and seizures” in an era of imaging technology and
digital-search algorithms, the Due Process Clauses85 in a world beset by
international terrorism, and so on.
So even if we buy the premise of the Framing generation’s superior
moral expertise as a general matter, the Framers never brought that
expertise to bear on many of the actual issues to which their general rules
apply today. This was a problem familiar to Aristotle, who noted that
all law is universal but about some things it is not possible to
make a universal statement which shall be correct. . . . [T]he
error is not in the law nor in the legislator but in the nature of the
thing, since the matter of practical affairs is of this kind from the
start.86
The Framers could not have considered every possible circumstance to
which their (very) general rules would apply in the future. Even if they had,
they hardly could have crafted general rules (“universal statements”)

83. Id. art. I.
84. Id. amend. IV.
85. Id. amends. IV, XIV.
86. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 935, bk. V, at
1020 (Richard McKeon ed., W.D. Ross trans., 1941). For a contemporary description of the
problem, see ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 25, at 34-36.
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capable of accounting for every such circumstance.87 A constitution pitched
at this level of detail “would partake of the prolixity of a legal code” (to say
the least) “and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind.”88
As our contemporary problems grow more distant from those the
Framers could have contemplated, the force of whatever moral wisdom the
Framers possessed gradually fades. It is one thing to trust the eighteenthcentury Framers’ judgment regarding private possession of front-loading
muskets as a safeguard against French invasion, Indian raids, and the threat
of federal troops also carrying front-loading muskets. It is another thing
entirely to imagine that the Framers’ judgment extended to the private
possession of Glocks as a safeguard against criminals carrying Uzis or
federal troops driving tanks, flying planes, and wearing body armor. The
Framers simply made no judgment on these modern questions. A Moral
Guidance account therefore gives us no reason to defer to their
(nonexistent) judgments about them.
Note here that this conceptual flaw is not contingent on the nature of the
framing process or even on the existence of considerable chronological
distance from the framing, although it is aggravated by the latter. As
Aristotle pointed out, “[T]he error is . . . in the nature of the thing”: no rule
maker will be able to anticipate and account for every instance in which its
rule may apply.89 A constitution framed tomorrow would confront
unforeseen circumstances beginning the day after tomorrow. If the reason
to obey constitutional rules is that they embody superior wisdom about the
circumstances to which they apply, that reason begins to dissipate as soon
as the rules are established.
Finally, Moral Guidance accounts suffer from a functional or practical
flaw: substantive disagreement with a constitutional provision is a reason,
on a Moral Guidance account, to question the authority of that provision.
Suppose a majority of Americans comes to believe the Second Amendment
is pernicious. On a Moral Guidance account, our reason to obey the
amendment anyway is that its Framers were more likely to be correct (about
the utility or justice of a right to keep and bear arms) than we are. But our
substantive disagreement with the amendment would undermine our faith in
the superior moral judgment of the people or process that framed it. As with
87. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 25, at 54 (“Lacking omniscience, [the
legislator] cannot anticipate all future problems that will meet the concrete conditions stated
in the rule; and if he could do this, the rule would be far too complex for practical
application.”).
88. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
89. ARISTOTLE, supra note 86, at 1020.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss3/1

2016]

WHAT ARE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOR?

461

a Moral Content account, then (though less directly), our perceived reason
to obey the amendment would dwindle as our disagreement with its content
grows. As a result, the perceived content-independence of the amendment’s
authority would be compromised: our disagreement with its content would
weaken our belief in its authority. The amendment (or any other
constitutional provision) would be least effective when it is needed most—
namely, when a majority of Americans disagrees with its substance.
In combination, these three flaws spell big trouble for Moral Guidance
accounts. In order for those accounts to work, it must be the case that (a)
the moral judgment of the framing process was credibly superior to that of
ordinary democracy with respect to a particular constitutional issue; (b) the
framing process actually rendered a judgment on the particular issue in
question—an increasing rarity given the pace of change in society, culture,
politics, technology, and so on; and (c) those who are subject to
constitutional law, but who disagree with the constitution on the substance
of an issue, nonetheless continue to accept the superior moral capacity of
the framing. The conjunction of these three conditions in the context of
modern constitutional law is likely to be quite rare indeed. Moral Guidance
accounts thus cannot bear the considerable weight necessary to justify
general constitutional authority.
D. Authority Through Procedure, Part I: Footnote Four
A Consensualist account can justify authority in theory, but it cannot
justify the authority of our Constitution in actual practice. A Moral Content
account cannot justify authority even in theory, because it fails the test of
content-independence. A Moral Guidance account suffers from both
theoretical and practical flaws. These latter two accounts stumble in part
because of their substantive nature: they bear the nearly impossible burden
of convincing people who disagree with the law to obey it nonetheless, on
the ground that the law is right and they are wrong.
The failure of these substantive accounts hints at an alternative way to
ground authority—not in the substance of what the law commands, but in
the process of how the law commands it. Such a “procedural” account
attributes authority to the Constitution, not because we have consented to it,
and not because it is a “good” constitution or because its Framers had
superior wisdom, but because something about the procedures of
constitutional law makes its results acceptable even by those who disagree
with them. Elsewhere I have referred to procedural accounts as “dispute
resolution” accounts, because it is the prospect of resolving or avoiding
costly disputes, according to these accounts, that might lead us to accept
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constitutional law despite our disagreement with its content.90 On
procedural or dispute-resolution accounts, we have an obligation to obey
constitutional commands because, and to the extent that, doing so will
resolve, mitigate, or avoid some costly substantive disagreement.
(1) Ely/Footnote Four. The best-developed procedural account of
constitutional authority is John Hart Ely’s elucidation of the famous
“Footnote Four” in the Supreme Court’s Carolene Products decision.91
Carolene Products deployed the now-standard “rational basis” approach to
rubber-stamp an arguably protectionist piece of economic regulation under
the Due Process Clause.92 In the fourth footnote of his opinion for the
Court, however, Justice Stone suggested that more-aggressive judicial
review might be appropriate in at least two kinds of circumstance: (1) those
where “legislation . . . restricts those political processes which can
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation”; and
(2) those where government action may be motivated by “prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities . . . .”93
Ely subsequently expanded Footnote Four into a full-blown justification
of judicial review, which he saw as grounded in the relative political
insularity of federal courts.94 Because they are not beholden to the political
majority or to other branches of government, Ely argued, federal courts can
identify and resist attempts by the majority to entrench its own power—to
“chok[e] off the channels of political change to ensure that they will stay in
and the outs will stay out”95—or to systematically disadvantage minorities
disfavored for irrational reasons like religion or race.96
We can understand Ely’s theory as an account of the authority of judicial
review. Ely provides a reason to think that constitutional decisions by the
judiciary impose a moral obligation of obedience upon us (the democratic
90. See PETERS, MATTER OF DISPUTE, supra note 38, at 57-61; Peters, What Lies
Beneath, supra note 19, at 1313-38; Peters, Originalism, supra note 55, at 219.
91. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); ELY, supra
note 14.
92. See 304 U.S. at 148-54. For a description of the Filled Milk Act (the statute upheld
in Carolene Products) as the product of special-interest rent-seeking, see Geoffrey Miller,
The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 397, 400-15.
93. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. The Carolene Products Court added a third
circumstance, not relevant to the analysis here: “when legislation appears on its face to be
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments.”
Id.
94. See generally ELY, supra note 14.
95. Id. at 103. See generally id. at 105-34.
96. See generally id. at 135-79.
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majority) and our representatives in government. That reason is not that
federal judges generally are wiser than the rest of us on the kinds of issues
that are covered by constitutional law (a type of Moral Guidance
rationale).97 It is, rather, that the federal judiciary can be more impartial
with respect to these issues than the self-interested or irrationally biased
democratic majority could be. If we accept this basic premise of
comparative impartiality (a big “if,” to be sure), then we have reason to
obey the judiciary’s interpretations of constitutional commands, even when
we disagree with those interpretations. The reason is that those
interpretations are (relatively) impartial—and thus more likely to be widely
accepted than the (relatively) less impartial interpretations that the
democratic process could produce. Ely thus argues, in effect, that we should
accept judicial review because doing so brings settlement to issues that
otherwise would be politically contested, perhaps in a very costly way.
And in fact Ely’s Footnote Four-inspired theory forms the basis of a
procedural account, not just of judicial authority, but of constitutional
authority more generally. (For ease of reference, I will refer to this account
of constitutional authority as the “Footnote Four” account.) If life-tenured
federal judges are relatively immune to democratic pathologies, then lifetenured federal judges interpreting rules laid down by long-ago generations
enjoy even greater immunity to these dysfunctions. The eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century Framers of the major constitutional provisions had their
self-interests, to be sure, but their self-interests were not our self-interests;
they had no inherent desire to entrench the power of our early-twenty-firstcentury democratic majority. Nor were their irrationalities (religious, racial,
gender-based) necessarily our irrationalities (although here the case for
comparative impartiality is at its weakest).98 If we submit certain kinds of
disputes to the judicially interpreted Framers—disputes involving questions
of contemporary power entrenchment or irrational majority bias—we are
consigning those disputes to a process that is more impartial, with respect to
those questions, than we ourselves (the contemporary democratic majority)
can be. The results of that process, therefore, are more likely to be widely
accepted, even by those who disagree with them, than are the results of
ordinary majoritarian politics. And our reason for obeying those results is
precisely that they are likely to be widely accepted—and thus that our

97. Ely rejects this rationale. Id. at 56-60.
98. On this point, see Peters, What Lies Beneath, supra note 19, at 1318-20; see also
infra note 103.
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obedience will contribute to the settlement of social disputes that otherwise
might be quite costly indeed.
As a brief example, consider the paradigmatic constitutional provision on
the Footnote Four account: the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.99
Suppose Congress enacts a statute prohibiting corporate-funded political
advertisements that directly refer to a candidate for federal office and run
within sixty days of a general election.100 The harms caused by these ads
may outweigh their contributions to political discourse, or they may not.
But there is good reason to deny to Congress the ultimate power to decide
this question, given all that its members have to gain or lose by the
decision. Allowing Congress to conclusively resolve issues involving the
extent of its own power is likely, over the long term, to yield the “long train
of abuses” that Jefferson and Locke thought might justify revolution.101 At
the very least it will undermine the political minority’s confidence that its
interests and viewpoints are being taken seriously, thus sowing the seeds of
social unrest.
This, on the Footnote Four account, is where constitutional law comes in.
By constitutionalizing a presumptive protection for political speech, the
First Amendment shifts final jurisdiction over these questions from the
(blatantly self-interested) political process to the (significantly less selfinterested) constitutional process, where it will be decided by politically
insular judges interpreting rules enacted by long-dead Framers. Our reason
for abiding by the results of this process is not that we have consented to
the process, or that its results are good ones, or that the process is wiser
than we are. Our reason, rather, is that the process can be generally
accepted as a comparatively fair one, capable of bringing relative quietude
to disputes that otherwise might boil over into costly social strife.

99. Ely discusses the Free Speech Clause at length. See ELY, supra note 14, at 105-16.
100. This was one effect of section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, 91 (2002). The scope of section 203 was substantially
restricted in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 463-64 (2007), and the provision
was ultimately held invalid in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 311-12 (2010).
101. In his Second Treatise, Locke noted that when “a long train of Abuses, . . . all
tending the same way”—that is, toward the benefit of those in power—becomes “visible to
the People, . . . ’tis not to be wonder’d, that they should then rouze themselves . . . .” LOCKE,
supra note 33, § 225, at 463. Jefferson cribbed this imagery for the Declaration of
Independence: “[W]hen a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same
Object[,] evinces a design to reduce [the People] under absolute Despotism, it is [the
People’s] right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government . . . .” THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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(2) The plausibility of Footnote Four. The Footnote Four account is not a
perfect account of constitutional authority.102 It does, however, avoid the
fatal flaws of the substantive accounts canvassed above.
Unlike a Consensualist account, the Footnote Four approach does not
depend on the fiction that modern-day Americans have consented to the
Constitution. Our reason to obey a constitutional command with which we
disagree is not that we supposedly have, at some earlier time, agreed to be
bound by that command. Our reason is that the process that generated the
command is more impartial than the alternative—ordinary politics—and
thus accepting its results now can bring relatively stable settlement to an
otherwise dangerously contentious issue.
Unlike a Moral Content or Moral Guidance account, the Footnote Four
approach is not undermined by the inevitable fact of substantive
disagreement with the Constitution’s commands. Recall that Moral Content
accounts make the substantive correctness of a command a necessary
criterion of its authority, and so a person who thinks a command is incorrect
perceives no reason to obey it. Moral Guidance accounts have the same
problem, albeit in attenuated form: a person’s disagreement with a
command provides a reason for her to question the basis of the command’s
authority, namely the supposedly superior wisdom of the process that
produced it. On the Footnote Four approach, however, disagreement (by
itself) does not serve as a reason to question constitutional authority,
because that authority is not contingent on the fact or likelihood that the
Constitution is correct. Indeed, actual or potential disagreement strengthens
the case for constitutional authority on the Footnote Four account, because
it underscores the need for an acceptably impartial procedure to resolve that
disagreement.
Finally, the Footnote Four account, unlike Moral Guidance accounts,
does not depend on the implausible notion that the Framers were
extraordinarily more morally capable than we are, or on the impossible
condition that the Framers considered how the Constitution would apply to
a host of unforeseen modern problems. For the account to work, Americans
need only see constitutional law as a relatively impartial way to resolve
certain issues; they need not believe that it is something close to infallible.
And it is at least plausible that applying general rules established by past
generations and interpreted by life-tenured judges is a less-partial way to
102. For discussions of the weaknesses of the Footnote Four account, see PETERS,
MATTER OF DISPUTE, supra note 38, at 69-78 (discussing a more-general version of the
account, called there a “Dispute Resolution” account); Peters, What Lies Beneath, supra note
19, at 1326-28.
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decide issues of power entrenchment than leaving them to ordinary
politics.103 Perfect impartiality is not necessary; the process need only be
sufficiently more impartial than ordinary politics to justify deference to it.
Footnote Four’s procedural account of constitutional authority, therefore,
is more plausible than its substantive rivals. It is at least conceivable that
the Footnote Four account can justify the authority of the Constitution. But
Footnote Four is not the only possible type of procedural account.
E. Authority Through Procedure, Part II: Bare Hobbesian Dispute
Resolution
It might be argued that we ought to obey constitutional law simply
because doing so will foreclose otherwise costly disputes—even if there is
no reason to think ordinary democratic procedures cannot manage those
disputes fairly. This is a form of what I have called a “bare Hobbesian”
account of authority. It holds that the goal of avoiding costly disputes is so
important that we ought to obey virtually any legal command, regardless of
the process by which that command was produced.104
A bare Hobbesian approach is a true procedural account, because it does
not depend on the substantive qualities of the Constitution or of the process
that generated it. As such, it preserves the content-independence necessary
for legal authority: one’s reason to obey the law (on this account) is
unrelated to its content and thus undistorted by whether one agrees with that
content.
As the Enlightenment rejection of Hobbesian authoritarianism amply
demonstrates,105 however, a bare Hobbesian account is saliently
unpersuasive. The account proves both too little and too much.
It proves too little in that it fails to justify the authority of constitutional
law beyond the bare-bones constitutive rules necessary to get government
institutions up and running. As H.L.A. Hart pointed out, some secondary
rules are necessary in order for a society (and certainly for a democratic
political community) to operate at all.106 We need to know whether primary
legal rules are valid, who may interpret and enforce them, what to do if we
103. It is less clear that deferring to the Framers’ judgments on issues involving the
danger of irrational prejudice will generate greater impartiality. The Framing generations
probably were at least as irrational as we are on questions of race, gender, religion, and
ethnicity, not to mention sexual orientation. For discussion of this point, see Peters, What
Lies Beneath, supra note 19, at 1318-20.
104. See id. at 1314-15; PETERS, MATTER OF DISPUTE, supra note 38, at 57-61, 119-22.
105. See PETERS, MATTER OF DISPUTE, supra note 38, at 119-22.
106. See HART, supra note 22, at 91-99.
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dispute their meaning or application, and how to change them. We also
need the secondary rules that answer these questions to be relatively stable.
Constitutional law can perform this literally constitutive function, as indeed
many provisions of the American Constitution do. Widespread
disobedience to these provisions would risk chaos, and avoiding chaos—the
Hobbesian mantra107—might itself be a good enough reason to obey
constitutive constitutional rules.
But avoiding chaos is not necessarily a good enough reason to obey
constitutional rules that protect individual rights, or even structural
constitutional rules beyond some very basic constitutive components. Once
the bare bones of democratic government are in place, that government
becomes fully capable of generating its own decisions on socially disputed
questions, and those democratically generated decisions can then be obeyed
as a means of avoiding the costs of unresolved disputes. The constitutive
function cannot justify constitutional rules that limit the outcomes of the
democratic process (except insofar as those outcomes undermine the basic
constitutive rules). The most prominent rights-conferring provisions in our
Constitution—those in the Bill of Rights and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments—go well beyond what is necessary to constitute a functioning
democratic government.108 Americans could strike these provisions from
the Constitution tomorrow without stepping down the slippery Hobbesian
slope toward anarchy. A bare Hobbesian account thus might justify
government and law at some level, but not most constitutional rights, and
certainly not constitutional law to the extent it exists in the American
system. In this respect the account proves too little.
It also proves too much, in that it would justify constitutive rules of any
content or provenance whatsoever. Hobbes himself used it, unconvincingly,
to defend absolutist monarchy.109 If avoiding disputes takes priority over all
107. See PETERS, MATTER OF DISPUTE, supra note 38, at 57-59 (describing Hobbes’s
normative theory of legal authority).
108. The same probably can be said for the “thicker” structural provisions of the
Constitution, such as those allocating power between the state and federal governments (e.g.,
the enumerated powers of Congress in Article I, Section 8). Once the basic mechanisms of
the federal government are in place, that government could decide the extent of its own
power vis-à-vis that of the states. Of course, the risk of power-entrenchment would be high,
justifying the existence of constitutional power-allocation rules on a Footnote Four
approach. But the bare Hobbesian account could not justify such rules, as they would not be
strictly necessary in order for government to operate.
109. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 241-47 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books
1968) (1651). This defense later was eviscerated by Locke with the observation that an
absolutist monarch’s subjects, after “a long train of abuses” by the ruler, eventually would
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other goods, then Americans have an obligation to obey any legal command
with respect to a controversial issue, no matter what it says and no matter
who generated it. Americans are unlikely to accept law (constitutional or
otherwise) on those terms, particularly since more-palatable alternatives are
available.
IV. The Second Amendment and Footnote Four
I believe that the five general accounts of constitutional authority
canvassed in Part III exhaust the field of reasonably plausible candidates.
For a variety of reasons, four of those accounts turn out not to be plausible
after all. A fifth, the Footnote Four version of a procedural account, seems
plausible—more so in any event than its rivals. The question for this part,
then, becomes: Can the Footnote Four account justify the Second
Amendment?
The answer, I argue here, depends on what the Second Amendment is
understood to mean. In this part, I consider three different reasonable
interpretations of the amendment: the “individual self-defense” reading
endorsed by the Heller majority; an “anti-tyranny” reading (really a family
of subtly different readings) hinted at in Heller and common in popular
discourse; and the “structural federalism” reading offered by the dissenters
in Heller. I contend that neither the Heller majority’s interpretation nor the
various anti-tyranny readings of the amendment can be reconciled with the
Footnote Four justification of constitutional authority. I suggest, however,
that the federalism-promoting interpretation advocated by the Heller
dissenters is at least potentially consistent with the Footnote Four account.
A. Heller and Footnote Four
In District of Columbia v. Heller,110 a five-justice majority of the
Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Antonin Scalia, held that the
Second Amendment protects, against federal government interference, an
individual right to keep and bear an operative handgun in the home for
purposes of self-defense.111 In McDonald v. City of Chicago,112 the same
majority, in an opinion by Samuel Alito, held that this right is
rebel against the monarch’s self-serving commands, thus defeating Hobbes’s overriding goal
of conflict-avoidance. See LOCKE, supra note 58, § 13, at 316-17; id. §§ 90-94, at 369-74; id.
§ 225, at 463; see also PETERS, MATTER OF DISPUTE, supra note 38, at 119-22 (describing
Locke’s critique of Hobbesian absolutism).
110. 554 U.S. 570, 635-36 (2008).
111. See id.
112. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
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“fundamental . . . to our system of ordered liberty” and thus is applicable
against the state governments through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.113
Is the Heller interpretation consistent with the only plausible account of
constitutional authority available, namely a procedural account similar to
that of Footnote Four? To put the question another way: Does Heller’s
Second Amendment possess valid authority on the Footnote Four
approach? I argue here that the answer is no.
The Footnote Four approach holds that the participants in everyday
democracy ought to defer to constitutional commands when the
constitutional process can be accepted as significantly more impartial than
ordinary democratic politics. As I discussed in Section III.D, Ely and
Footnote Four identified two basic circumstances in which this might
plausibly be the case.
First, constitutional law might serve an anti-entrenchment function: it
might be comparatively impartial in determining whether measures that risk
power entrenchment by the majority, or by government officials, are in fact
justified. The First Amendment’s Speech, Press, Petition, and Assembly
Clauses114 obviously serve this function, as do most of the Constitution’s
criminal-procedure provisions115 and its various protections of the right to
vote.116
113. See id. at 767-78. Justice Clarence Thomas, the fifth vote necessary to form the
majority in McDonald, wrote a separate opinion in which he reached the same result as
Justice Alito but used the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
not the Due Process Clause, to do so. Id. at 805-06 (Thomas, J., concurring in the result).
114. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.”).
115. See id. art. I, § 9 (prohibiting suspension of habeas corpus except “in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion,” and prohibiting bills of attainder and ex post facto laws); id. art. III,
§ 3 (requiring two witnesses or a confession for a treason conviction and prohibiting
“corruption of blood” as punishment for treason); id. amend. IV (prohibiting “unreasonable
searches and seizures” and prescribing requirements for warrants); id. amend. V (requiring
grand jury indictment for “capital[] or otherwise infamous crime[s],” prohibiting double
jeopardy and compelled self-incrimination, and requiring due process for deprivations of
life, liberty, or property); id. amend. VI (providing for “a speedy and public trial” by an
impartial local jury, requiring that the accused be informed about the accusation against him,
and providing rights to confrontation, compulsory process, and defense counsel); id. amend.
VIII (prohibiting “excessive” bail or fines and “cruel and unusual punishments”).
116. See id. amend. XIV, § 2 (reducing the congressional representation of a state that
denies the right to vote to adult male citizens); id. amend. XV (prohibiting denial or
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Second, constitutional law might serve an anti-bias function: it might be
relatively impartial in deciding whether laws that disadvantage “discrete
and insular minorities”117 reflect or perpetuate irrational prejudice. The
Religion118 and Equal Protection Clauses119 (for instance) easily can be
understood in this light.
To these circumstances we might add a third: constitutional law can
serve the literally constitutive function discussed in Section III.E above,
establishing the basic ground rules by which government can operate.120
Ordinary democratic politics cannot decide issues (impartially or otherwise)
if a democratic system does not yet exist. Relatively stable rules are needed
to establish the basic governmental institutions and procedures necessary
for a democracy to come into, and remain in, existence. Many provisions of
Articles I through III of our Constitution qualify as constitutive rules in this
sense.121
As interpreted in Heller, however, the Second Amendment serves none
of these functions.
(1) Heller and the constitutive function. First of all, the Second
Amendment as interpreted in Heller clearly is not the sort of foundational
constitutive rule that is necessary for democratic government to operate.
Americans can tell who makes, enforces, and interprets the laws that govern
them, and how those laws are made, enforced, and interpreted, without
having to know anything about gun possession for purposes of self-defense.
(2) Heller and the anti-entrenchment function. Nor does the Heller
version of the Second Amendment further an anti-entrenchment objective.
Empowered officials or majorities have no self-interest in preventing

abridgment of the right to vote “on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude”); id. amend. XIX (prohibiting denial or abridgment of the right to vote “on
account of sex”); id. amend. XXIII (apportioning presidential electors to the District of
Columbia); id. amend. XXIV (prohibiting denial of the right to vote “by reason of failure to
pay any poll tax or other tax”); id. amend. XXVI (prohibiting denial of the right to vote to
citizens age eighteen or older “on account of age”).
117. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)
(“[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities . . . .”).
118. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).
119. Id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.”).
120. See PETERS, MATTER OF DISPUTE, supra note 38, at 243-46.
121. But see supra note 108.
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citizens from defending themselves against private aggressors, and
therefore there is no reason not to trust the democratic process to resolve
disputes about the scope of a “right” or privilege of armed self-defense. As
I explain in Section IV.B below, the “right . . . to keep and bear Arms”
might guard against self-interested power-entrenchment if it is construed to
protect an individual right to defend, not against private aggression, but
rather against government tyranny. But despite a few hints in Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion,122 this is not the construction given the
Amendment by the Heller majority.
Let me be clear on this point: there is plenty of reason to worry that the
ordinary political process will generate bad decisions on the question of
whether to allow armed self-defense. I personally believe that so-called
“stand-your-ground” laws123 are horrible public policy and that NRA and
gun-industry financial clout is largely to blame for them.124 Pro-gun
advocates probably have similar distaste for relatively strict registration and
possession laws in jurisdictions that have them. But poor public policy,
influenced by special-interest lobbying and campaign expenditures, is
pretty much an across-the-board risk in our democracy. That risk alone
cannot justify constitutionalizing every policy issue that is subject to it;
otherwise there would be no space left for ordinary democracy.
On the Footnote Four approach, constitutional law comes into play when
there is a systemic danger, not just of bad policy or even of policy that
serves special interests, but rather of self-interested power-entrenchment by
the democratic majority or by officials in government.125 And there is no
122. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
123. Such as the laws on the books in Florida, FLA. STAT. § 776.032 (2014), and
Alabama, ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23 (2014).
124. See P. Luevonda Ross, The Transmogrification of Self-Defense by National-RifleAssociation-Inspired Statutes: From the Doctrine of Retreat to the Right to Stand Your
Ground, 35 S. U. L. REV. 1, 25-28 (2007) (asserting that NRA lobbying was behind many
such laws). The article cites material from the NRA website that unfortunately can no longer
be found there.
125. I have suggested elsewhere that the basic Footnote Four approach might be
expanded to include special-interest rent-seeking among the systemic dysfunctions in
democracy that justify constitutional law. See PETERS, MATTER OF DISPUTE, supra note 38, at
261-63. This might justify heightened constitutional scrutiny of legislation in circumstances
that suggest rent-seeking, but it cannot justify the Heller reading of the Second Amendment.
See generally District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). For one thing, there is no
reason to think that the subject of gun regulation is especially prone to rent-seeking, enough
so to justify its own constitutional provision; surely the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses, properly interpreted, can police rent-seeking in that context as they do in many
others. And even if gun regulation is a special enough hotbed of rent-seeking to warrant its
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good reason to think that the issue of whether and how to regulate armed
self-defense against private aggression poses this sort of risk. Private
aggression run amok, without the threat of law-abiding gun possession to
stop it, would hardly strengthen the majority’s existing hold on power.
(Again, I am putting aside until the next section the possibility, not formally
endorsed by Heller, that the Second Amendment serves the “anti-tyranny”
function of protecting against unjustified aggression by the government
itself.)
(3) Heller and the anti-bias function. Interestingly, the most appealing
Footnote Four-based argument in favor of Heller’s Second Amendment is
an anti-bias argument. Justice Alito suggested such an argument in his
opinion for the Court in McDonald, writing in passing that “the Second
Amendment . . . protects the rights of minorities and other residents of highcrime areas whose needs are not being met by elected public officials.”126
But this point, assuming it is true, proves too much. Many needs of
“minorities and other residents of high-crime areas . . . are not being met by
elected public officials,” 127 including the needs for education, housing, and
health care. Does this justify constitutional rights to these goods on the
Footnote Four approach?
The answer is no. The anti-bias rationale does not warrant a
constitutional remedy in every case of failed public policy, even when
“discrete and insular minorities”128 are disproportionately victimized by

own constitutional rule, the relevant rent-seekers are the gun industry, which benefits from
the Second Amendment as interpreted in Heller. An anti-rent-seeking Second Amendment
would not protect gun rights against government regulation; it would protect gun regulation
from industry rent-seeking.
126. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 790 (2010). Justice Alito was
responding to Justice Breyer’s argument in dissent that the Heller reading of the Amendment
was not justified by Footnote Four concerns. See id. at 912, 921 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In a
similar vein, one might cite efforts to disarm (or prevent the arming of) African-Americans
after the Civil War as evidence that a right to bear arms is necessary to protect racial
minorities from bias-motivated violence. Both the Heller majority and the McDonald
plurality alluded to this history. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 609, 614-16; McDonald, 561 U.S. at
770-78; see also McDonald, 561 U.S. at 805, 835-37 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment); cf. Nicholas J. Johnson, Firearms Policy and the Black Community: An
Assessment of the Modern Orthodoxy, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1491 (2013) (contending that
mainstream African-American support for stringent gun-control laws is inconsistent with the
historical and continuing failure of government to protect African-Americans from private
violence).
127. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 790.
128. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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these failures.129 The rationale applies, rather, only in cases where systemic
majority bias against minorities prevents those minorities from participating
fairly and fully in the democratic process. The Framers, wisely in my view,
codified only one type of circumstance so prone to this dysfunction that it
always triggers heightened constitutional scrutiny: legislation targeting
religion.130 Because religion, then as now, was an obvious and recurring
ground of majority bias, the Religion Clauses allocate to the constitutional
process—not to ordinary politics—the ultimate authority to decide whether
the “free exercise” of religion has been unjustifiably impaired or an
“establishment of religion” has occurred.131
But the primary anti-bias provision in the Constitution—the Equal
Protection Clause132—does not itself single out any particular type or
ground of legislation as especially prone to irrational prejudice. While that
clause was inspired by the plight of recently freed slaves, its Framers (again
wisely in my view) did not draft it as the “Protection of Freed Slaves
Clause” or the “Protection Against Racial Prejudice Clause.” Instead they
129. Note that one may argue against stringent gun control as a matter of policy—on the
ground (say) that government has failed to protect against private violence—without arguing
for a constitutional right against stringent gun control. Nicholas Johnson, for example,
makes a thoughtful and provocative case that strict gun laws do not benefit many AfricanAmerican communities, which tend to suffer disproportionately from continuing “state
failure and impotence” to police private violence. See Johnson, supra note 126, at 1496,
1532-53. Even assuming this is a decisive argument against stringent gun-control policies, it
does not entail that constitutional limitations on such policies are legitimate. As interpreted
in Heller, the Second Amendment makes these policy debates largely irrelevant; there
simply is a right to armed self-defense, whether that is good policy or not. 554 U.S. at 63536 (holding that the right to have a handgun in the home for self-defense cannot be
infringed). And of course that right is not limited to citizens or communities that have
disproportionately been victimized by government incompetence, or for that matter by
government hostility.
130. E.g., Larson v. Valenta, 456 U.S. 228, 244-47 (1982) (applying Establishment
Clause strict scrutiny to a state law that granted a preference for some religious
denomination over others); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (requiring that a
law be invalidated under the Establishment Clause if it lacks a secular purpose, has a
principal effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or fosters excessive government
entanglement with religion); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 531-32 (1993) (applying Free Exercise Clause strict scrutiny to a local ordinance that
intentionally burdened the practices of a particular religion).
131. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”); id. art. VI, cl. 3 (Religious Test
Clause) (prohibiting any “religious Test . . . as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust
under the United States”).
132. See id. amend. XIV, § 1.
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left its language open-ended, capable of being applied against whatever
instances of democracy-crippling prejudice, on whatever basis, should
emerge in the future. The Supreme Court, appropriately, has given structure
to the clause by applying heightened scrutiny to legislation targeted at
characteristics that, like race, have proven particularly susceptible to
irrational majority bias.133
If systemic prejudice is responsible for disadvantaging racial minorities
in “high-crime areas,” then the most obvious constitutional remedy lies
with the Equal Protection Clause.134 It is much less obvious, to say the least,
that an across-the-board private right to gun possession can be justified as a
way to overcome the effects of government neglect of racial minorities.
Gun possession is not like religion; there is no persistent historical trend of
irrational majority bias against gun owners. Gun owners are not a “discrete
and insular minority”135 in contemporary American society and probably
never have been. Anti-gun legislation that is truly irrational—born of a
“bare . . . desire to harm” gun owners as a class—would be a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause and could be invalidated on that basis.136 If the
133. See generally, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (intermediate
scrutiny of laws classifying by gender); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (strict scrutiny
of laws classifying by race).
134. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. It is true—and of debatable wisdom—that the Court
has limited heightened scrutiny under the Clause to cases of “intentional” discrimination
based on race or other suspect criteria. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-43
(1976). It also is true that our Constitution, generally speaking, stops short of protecting
“affirmative” rights to government benefits (like education or health care), as opposed to
“negative” rights against impairment of certain interests or discrimination in the allocation of
benefits. But these principles are largely the function of Supreme Court interpretations,
rather than immutable features of the Constitution itself. See LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE
IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 84-128 (2004)
(contending that some “affirmative” rights, such as a right to a minimum level of welfare,
are protected in principle by the Constitution but underprotected in practice thanks to
considerations of institutional competence). The Court could redress the problem at which
Justice Alito hints—government failure to address basic needs of minority populations—by
(for instance) applying heightened equal-protection scrutiny to policies that create a
disparate racial impact and are caused, not by an active intent to discriminate, but by neglect
born of persistent racial stereotypes and power imbalances. See McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 790 (2010). This would seem a more apt response than interpreting
the Second Amendment to protect private gun possession.
135. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
136. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (employing equal
protection and substantive due process to invalidate a federal statute that denied recognition
of same-sex marriages, on the ground that the statute “seeks to injure” same-sex couples);
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (employing equal protection to invalidate a state
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worry is majority prejudice, Heller’s interpretation of the Second
Amendment is overkill.137
(4) Heller’s substantive Second Amendment. There is, then, no
persuasive case to be made that the Footnote Four approach justifies the
authority of the Second Amendment as interpreted by the Heller
majority.138 On the Heller reading, the amendment commands the
democratic majority to honor the individual right to bear arms for selfdefense.139 That command is not justified on Footnote Four’s version of a
procedural account: it is not necessary to preserve some aspect of fair
democratic governance. It is, rather, a substantive command—an extrinsic
limit on what fair democratic government may do. Such a substantive
constraint might be consistent with a Consensualist, Moral Content, or
Moral Guidance account of constitutional authority. But those substantive
approaches, as I’ve argued, are implausible.
B. Footnote Four and an Anti-“Tyranny” Second Amendment
Gun-rights advocates often speak of the right to bear arms as a hedge
against “tyranny.”140 Indeed, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Heller
referenced such a view, although ultimately it was not the view embodied
in the decision.141 Typically, however, this rhetoric does not carefully
constitutional amendment denying antidiscrimination protection to homosexuals, on the
ground that the amendment “is born of animosity toward” homosexuals); Dep’t of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (employing equal protection to invalidate a ban on the
use of food stamps by “unrelated persons” in eligible households, on the ground that the ban
derived from “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group,” namely “hippies”
living communally).
137. See generally District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding that the
right to have a handgun in the home for self-defense cannot be infringed).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. A quick Google search returns page after page of examples. Here are just a couple: Joe
Otto, Second Amendment: Last Line of Defense Against Tyranny, CONSERVATIVE DAILY (Feb.
15, 2014), http://conservative-daily.com/2014/02/15/second-amendment-last-line-of-defenseagainst-tyranny/; Bob Owens, Facing Tyranny, Embracing the Second Amendment, BEARING
ARMS (Feb. 16, 2014, 12:26 PM), http://bearingarms.com/facing-tyranny-embracing-thesecond-amendment/. But see Mark Nuckols, Why the “Citizen Militia” Theory Is the Worst
Pro-Gun Argument Ever, ATLANTIC (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/
archive/2013/01/why-the-citizen-militia-theory-is-the-worst-pro-gun-argument-ever/272734/
(citing January 2013 poll showing “65 percent of Americans see gun rights as a protection
against tyranny” and quoting Senator Tom Coburn to that effect). See generally Williams,
supra note 3 (presenting an academic version of the anti-tyranny argument).
141. To be precise: Justice Scalia asserted that the “ab[ility] to resist tyranny” was among
the Framers’ reasons for codifying the “right to keep and bear Arms” in the Second
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distinguish between two different ways in which government action might
be “tyrannical.”
First, a government might take actions that are valid according to the
standards of its legal system but nonetheless unjust. American state and
federal laws preserving and implementing slavery prior to the Civil War are
(now) a fairly noncontroversial example.142 The problem with government
actions like these is a moral one, not a legal one: they are unjust, but they
are legally valid.
Or, second, a government might take actions that are both unjust and
invalid: actions that violate principles of political morality and are enacted
or enforced contrary to the formal requirements of the legal system in
question. Southern “massive resistance” to school desegregation after
Brown v. Board of Education143 is a case in point.144 The problem with such
government actions is twofold: they are both illegal and unjust.
Both these types of government conduct might be encompassed within
the general concept of “tyranny.” And the Second Amendment might be
seen as a hedge against both of them: by protecting the right of citizens to
arm themselves, the amendment makes it more difficult for the government
to enforce its unjust and/or illegal policies. In assessing whether the
amendment is authoritative, however, it matters which variety of “tyranny”
is at issue.

Amendment. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 597-600 (2008) (quoted
language at p. 598). But the right that was thus codified, according to Justice Scalia, was the
right to keep and bear arms for purposes of self-defense. See id. at 599-600. See generally id.
at 579-95 (explaining that the “right . . . to keep and bear Arms” was understood at the time
of the Founding primarily as a right of individual self-defense). And it was this “central
component” of the right—not the right to bear arms for other purposes, such as resisting
tyranny or hunting—that the Court held was violated by the District of Columbia ordinances
at issue in Heller. See id. at 599 (describing “self-defense” as “the central component of the
right [to bear arms] itself”); see also id. at 628 (“the inherent right of self-defense has been
central to the Second Amendment right”); id. at 635 (“In sum, we hold that the District’s ban
on handgun possession in the home violates the Second Amendment, as does its prohibition
against rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for the purpose of immediate selfdefense.”).
142. Such as the federal Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302, and 1850, ch. 50,
9 Stat. 452, which were valid as implementations of the Constitution’s Fugitive Slave
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
143. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
144. For an efficient overview of Southern resistance and other reactions to Brown, see 2
MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY 862-70 (3d ed. 2011) (and
see p. 872 for a list of sources).
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(1) A right to resist lawful but unjust government conduct. Imagine, then,
the following interpretation of the Second Amendment: it protects a right to
bear arms for the purpose of resisting government conduct that is lawful but
unjust. On its surface, this interpretation appears consistent with a
procedural account of authority along Footnote Four lines. Surely the
government itself—perhaps even the electoral majority supposedly
represented by the government—cannot be trusted to fairly resolve the
question of whether government conduct is “just.” The temptation of
power-entrenchment would be too salient. By constitutionalizing the right
to resist unjust government action, the Second Amendment (thus
interpreted) removes that question from majoritarian hands and assigns it to
politically insular constitutional processes—a classic Footnote Four
rationale.
There are two conceptual flaws, however, with this version of the antityranny interpretation. The first flaw is that the argument posits a (legal)
right to resist (legal) injustice—that is, a legal right to disobey the law.
Such a right would be logically incoherent—a contradiction in terms. If one
has a legal right to disobey a law, then the supposed “law” being disobeyed
is not really valid law at all. If the law to be disobeyed is valid law, then
one cannot have a legal right to disobey it, and legal authorities would be
legally justified in punishing disobedience. If legal authorities are legally
justified in punishing disobedience, then disobedience cannot be a legal
right.
Note that to deny the coherence of a legal right to disobey (valid) law is
not to deny the existence of a moral right to do so. As I discussed in Section
II.A.3, above, the moral duty to obey even legitimately authoritative law
cannot be absolute: sometimes disobedience will be the (morally) correct
thing to do.145 The point here is simply that a right of disobedience, when
and if it exists, cannot be a legal right. It is incoherent to assert a (valid)
legal right to disobey a (valid) law. And so it cannot be a valid
interpretation of the Second Amendment to read that provision as codifying
a legal right of disobedience to valid law.
Is this problem solved by noting that the supposed legal right to disobey
is constitutional in stature, while presumably most or all unjust laws against
which the right would be wielded will be subconstitutional? (There is, after
all, nothing logically incoherent about asserting that (superior)

145. On this point, see also ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 25, at 53-95 (discussing
what the authors believe is an ineliminable “moral gap” between the correctness of enacting
general laws and the (occasional) correctness of disobeying them).
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constitutional law trumps (inferior) subconstitutional law.) The answer is
no, because conflict with the Constitution renders a subconstitutional law
invalid, not valid but subject to lawful disobedience.146 Constitutional law is
power-conferring in the sense meant by H.L.A. Hart:147 consistency with
the Constitution is a necessary condition for the validity of
subconstitutional law. It is one thing to assert that an ordinary statute
conflicts with some provision of the Constitution and is therefore invalid. It
is another thing entirely to assert that an ordinary statute, while valid as
law, nonetheless is unjust and thus subject to a constitutional right of armed
resistance. The former proposition subjects ordinary law to a constitutional
test of validity. The latter proposition supposes that two valid laws can be
mutually inconsistent—a logical impossibility.148
The second conceptual flaw with a right to resist valid but unjust laws is
that such a right would vitiate the fundamental understanding of law that is
reflected in a procedural account. A procedural account (such as Footnote
Four) holds that constitutional authority is justified by the need to
peacefully avoid, mitigate, or resolve disputes. As I have explained
elsewhere, this approach reflects a more general account of legal authority
by which the core function of law as a whole is peaceful dispute
resolution.149 The basic notion—traceable at least as far back as
Hobbes150—is that dispute resolution left in private hands inevitably invites
violent conflict, and so the law must assert a monopoly on coercive dispute
resolution in order to prevent private parties from “resolving”
disagreements through violence.
To recognize a “right” to violently resist “unjust” laws, however, is to
transfer the power of coercive dispute resolution back into private hands.
Surely people of good faith can disagree about whether almost any given
law is in fact unjust. Law’s solution to this is to channel that disagreement
146. See U.S. CONST. art. 6, cl. 2.
147. In rejecting an Austinian model of law as merely orders backed by threats, Hart
pointed out that many legal rules do not fit the model: they make it possible for private
individuals or government officials to do something (that is, they confer powers) rather than
forbidding or requiring them to do something (that is, imposing duties). See HART, supra
note 22, at 26-42.
148. Or at least a violation of a seemingly fundamental principle of valid law, namely
that it not command the impossible. See LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 36-37, 38-39,
65-79 (rev. ed. 1969) (citing, among other tenets of the “internal morality of law,” the
principles that law not be self-contradictory and that it not demand the impossible).
149. See generally PETERS, MATTER OF DISPUTE, supra note 38.
150. See generally HOBBES, supra note 109; see also PETERS, MATTER OF DISPUTE, supra
note 38, at 57-59 (situating Hobbes’s theory within a dispute-resolution context).
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through acceptable lawmaking, law-interpreting, and law-enforcing
procedures. A right of armed resistance would, in effect, allow any citizen
to defect from this solution if she disagrees with the results of the legal
process. As Gregory Magarian writes, “[A]ny agitated individual or
aggrieved group may decide what types and number of arms to stockpile in
order to deter tyranny and, ultimately, when to resort to violence.”151 And
there is no way to limit this “right to defect” to cases of “truly” unjust laws,
because what is “truly” unjust is precisely what people will disagree
about.152 The result would be the dissolution of law itself: anyone who felt
strongly enough about the “injustice” of a particular law would effectively
be authorized to resist that law by force of arms. The endgame is a
Hobbesian state of nature, a war of all against all—precisely the disaster
that law, on a procedural account, exists to avoid.
However rhetorically appealing a Second Amendment “right to resist
unjust laws” might be, then, such a reading would be inconsistent with the
fundamental justification of legal authority assumed by the proceduralist
position.153
151. Gregory P. Magarian, Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First Amendment
Destabilizes the Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 49, 94 (2012); see also Carl T. Bogus, Heller and
Insurrectionism, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 253, 257 (2008) (“The fundamental problem with
legitimizing insurrectionism as an acceptable last resort is that there are always people who
believe that governmental tyranny is not merely a future prospect, but a present reality.”);
Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean Today?, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
291, 320 (2000) (stating that Shay’s Rebellion and the Whiskey Rebellion “demonstrated in
the founding era what acts by the likes of Timothy McVeigh have demonstrated in our own
time: that placing a right to rebel against tyranny in the hands of individuals risks violence
by every would-be Spartacus”).
152. See Bogus, supra note 152, at 265.
It does not solve the problem to say that the militia or the people may only take
up arms against the government “if necessary” or “as a last resort.” Tyranny,
like beauty, can be in the eye of the holder. When he leapt to the stage after
murdering Abraham Lincoln, John Wilkes Booth shouted: “Sic semper
tyrannis” (thus always to tyrants).
Id.
153. Gregory Magarian argues convincingly that an anti-tyranny (or “insurrectionist”)
reading of the Second Amendment is deeply at odds with the doctrine of free speech that has
developed under the First Amendment. Magarian, supra note 152, at 92-98. The Supreme
Court has interpreted the Free Speech Clause quite robustly, to allow vigorous expressions
of political dissent that advocate violence, even insurrection, so long as they do not incite
imminent violence. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). As Magarian points
out, the resulting principle is inconsistent with the notion of a right of armed resistance to
tyranny. Magarian, supra note 152, at 92-98. Free speech doctrine embodies a commitment
to political change through advocacy, which necessarily is a collective, indeed majoritarian
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(2) A right to resist illegal and unjust government conduct. Suppose,
however, that we give the Second Amendment a slightly but crucially
different anti-tyranny reading. The amendment might be understood to
confer a right to resist government conduct that is both unjust (morally
speaking) and invalid (legally speaking). This reading also seems at least
superficially consistent with the Footnote Four version of a procedural
account. If the government or the political majority cannot be trusted to
decide whether its actions are unjust, it certainly cannot be trusted to decide
whether its actions are both unjust and illegal. Constitutionalizing a right to
resist unjust and illegal actions thus removes that decision from the
saliently self-interested political branches.
Note that this modified anti-tyranny interpretation avoids the first
conceptual flaw I identified in the prior version, namely logical
incoherence.154 There is nothing incoherent about recognizing a legal right
to resist illegal government actions—any more than it is incoherent to give
officials a legal right to punish illegal private actions. Recognizing such a
right does not suppose that the same conduct can be both legally authorized
and legally forbidden.
The second conceptual problem, however, remains in this revised version
of the anti-tyranny interpretation. Conferring a legal right to resist unjust
and illegal government actions would, in effect, transfer the function of
coercive dispute resolution from public hands to private ones. People often
will disagree about whether a given government action is unjust, illegal, or
both. Law’s solution to this problem of disagreement is, again, to resolve it
through agreeable processes of lawmaking, law-interpreting, and law
enforcement. A right to resist “unjust” and “illegal” conduct is, in essence,
a right to take the law into one’s own hands—to reject the results of these
democratic processes in favor of individual violence. There is no principled
way to halt the inevitable slide down the slippery slope towards Hobbesian
chaos if such a “right” is acknowledged.155
process. Id. at 94. Advocacy “requires communication and persuasion,” and it allows “the
government, and whatever individuals and groups . . . support the government, the same
opportunities as would-be revolutionaries to speak and persuade, to listen and adjust.” Id.
But a right of armed resistance is a “very different proces[s]”; it licenses any “agitated
individual or aggrieved group” unilaterally to defect from the democratic process and
impose violence on the rest of the citizenry. Id. See generally Christopher J. Peters,
Persuasion: A Model of Majoritarianism as Adjudication, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2001)
(discussing the importance of persuasion to democratic legitimacy).
154. See supra Section IV.B.1 (discussing the logical impossibility of a legal right to
disobey a valid law).
155. See generally HOBBES, supra note 109.
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Again, I am not claiming that resistance (even violent resistance) to
government tyranny is never justified, morally speaking.156 I am claiming
only that such resistance cannot be legally justified. No doubt
circumstances will arise—certainly they have arisen historically—in which
the correct thing to do, morally speaking, is to resist the law, valid or
invalid. Members of the Civil Rights movement, for example, called
attention to the injustice of Jim Crow laws by resisting those laws.157 By
carefully calibrating their resistance only to particular laws they deemed
unjust, however, and by accepting legal punishment for their actions, these
practitioners of civil disobedience made their point while still respecting the
general authority of the law.158
To resist valid laws on grounds of injustice, however, while then
resisting legal punishment for doing so is to reject the rule of law entirely.
This kind of resistance declares that law’s dispute-resolution function no
longer outweighs the imperative of substantive justice. It is plausible that
the wholesale rejection of legality—as a last resort, until a reasonably just
system can be established—is morally permissible. But the notion of a legal
right to reject legality is nonsensical, at least if one accepts a procedural
account of legal authority.
So anti-“tyranny” interpretations of the Second Amendment’s “right . . .
to keep and bear Arms,” despite their popularity and their tangential
endorsement by the majority in Heller, are not in fact consistent with a
procedural account of constitutional authority, which I’ve argued is the only
plausible type of account available.159 If the chief function of constitutional
law is to avoid, mitigate, or resolve costly disputes, we should not read the

156. See supra Section II.A.3 (discussing the defeasibility of the obligation to obey the
law).
157. See, e.g., Martin Luther King Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail (Apr. 1, 1963)
(original manuscript), http://okra.stanford.edu/transcription/document_images/undecided/63
0416-019.pdf.
158. This was Martin Luther King’s insight when he wrote the following in his Letter
from a Birmingham Jail:
In no sense do I advocate evading or defying the law as the rabid segregationist
would do. This would lead to anarchy. One who breaks an unjust law must do it
openly, lovingly, . . . and with a willingness to accept the penalty. I submit that
an individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and willingly
accepts the penalty by staying in jail to arouse the conscience of the community
over its injustice, is in reality expressing the very highest respect for the law.
Id.
159. See supra Section II.D.
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Second Amendment to frustrate that purpose—at least not if a better
reading is available.
(3) Decoupling a right to keep and bear arms from a right to resist. My
arguments in the previous two sections depend on the notion that a right to
keep and bear arms for the purpose of preventing tyranny necessarily
implies a right to use those arms to resist tyranny. On this assumption, an
anti-tyranny reading of the Second Amendment protects a legal right to
armed resistance against a tyrannical government. It is this concept of a
legal “right” to armed resistance that I reject as logically incoherent,
inconsistent with the premises of a procedural account, or both.
It is not obvious, however, that my assumption holds. That is, it seems
conceptually possible that the Second Amendment could protect a right to
keep and bear arms for the purpose of preventing tyranny without also
protecting a right to actually use those arms to resist (purportedly)
tyrannical conduct. Perhaps protecting the right of citizens to keep and bear
arms, even without acknowledging a right to use those arms, will deter the
government from acting tyrannically for fear of meeting armed (albeit
illegal) resistance. The closest analogy that comes to mind involves nuclear
deterrence: we might say that a nation has a right to keep nuclear weapons
as a deterrent against nuclear attacks by other nations, even if we would not
say the nation has the right to actually use those weapons if attacked.160
If it is possible to decouple the two supposed rights in this way, my prior
objections seem to dissolve. The right to keep and bear arms would not
entail a legal “right” to resist valid law, and thus it would not be logically
incoherent. Nor would it necessarily entail a legal “right” to defect from
lawful settlements of disputed issues by resisting laws deemed “tyrannical,”
so it would not vitiate the very purpose of law on a procedural account.
I am not convinced, however, that it is in fact possible to decouple the
right to possess arms (for purposes of preventing tyranny) from the right to
use those arms to resist conduct thought to be tyrannical. True, it is
conceptually possible to decouple a possession right from a use right. In
saying I have a legal right to possess item X, I have not logically committed
myself to the further proposition that I have a legal right to use item X. For
example, we might recognize the legal right of a pharmacist to possess a
dangerous drug in her inventory without also recognizing her legal right
actually to use that drug herself.
160. I am grateful to David Jaros, Colin Starger, and Maxwell Stearns for suggesting the
possibility of decoupling the right to bear arms from the right to armed resistance. The
nuclear deterrence analogy did not in fact just “come to mind”; it was posed by Colin
Starger.
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But whether it makes sense to decouple possession rights from use rights
depends entirely on the context. In particular, it depends on our purpose or
rationale for recognizing the right to possession. The question to ask is not
whether the right to keep and bear arms ever implies a right to use those
arms. The question is whether the right to keep and bear arms for a
particular purpose—the prevention of tyranny—implies a right to use those
arms for that purpose.
Consider again the pharmacist analogy. Our purpose for allowing the
pharmacist to possess dangerous drugs is so she can lawfully sell them to
others who have a prescription for them (i.e., a lawful right to use them).
Given this purpose, it makes sense to allow the pharmacist to possess the
drugs but not to use them herself. The purpose of allowing her to possess
them is so she can sell them to someone else who has a right to use them.
Under anti-tyranny rationales, however, our purpose for allowing
citizens to possess arms is not that those citizens can then provide the arms
to someone else who has a right to use them. Our purpose, rather, is to deter
the government from engaging in tyranny out of fear of armed resistance.
That purpose depends on the possibility that the government actually will
fear armed resistance—that is, that the government will believe citizens
might actually use the arms in their possession, despite the absence of a
legal right to use them. The right to possess arms thus depends on the
existence of a realistic possibility that those arms will be used illegally.
It seems to me that to endorse a realistic threat of illegal activity is
conceptually indistinguishable from endorsing the illegal activity itself. Or,
if the two are conceptually distinguishable, the distinction is too thin to
have normative significance. Free-speech law might be instructive on this
point. In addition to punishing violent acts, government, consistently with
the First Amendment, may punish “true threats” of violent action:
“statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression
of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual
or group of individuals.”161 In a strict sense, speech threatening violence is
conceptually distinct from actual violence. But the government’s strong
interest in preventing the latter justifies its punishment of the former; the
threat is subsumed within the activity being threatened. In condemning the
threat, the government is effectively condemning the activity being
threatened. So too, the Second Amendment’s endorsement of the threat (of
armed resistance) would effectively be an endorsement of the activity being
threatened (armed resistance).
161. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
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If this analysis is correct, then both of the conceptual problems with antityranny rationales reemerge. The Second Amendment, while not actually
licensing illegal activity, would endorse that activity, which seems a
distinction without a difference. It also would endorse individual defection
from the law’s settlement of social disputes, which would vitiate the
dispute-resolution purpose of law on procedural accounts.
I think the nuclear deterrence analogy mentioned above actually supports
this conclusion. In fact there is no internationally recognized right to
possess nuclear weapons—quite the contrary: the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which 190 nations are parties, actually
prohibits the provision of nuclear weapons to nations that do not already
have them.162 Once a nation possesses nuclear weapons, of course, it makes
sense to deny it the right to use those weapons. But this does not mean we
can decouple possession from use in deciding whether to allow a right to
possession in the first place. To recognize a right to possession of weapons
in the interest of deterring their use by others is to implicitly endorse their
use by the possessor in appropriate circumstances. Otherwise, the intended
deterrent effect would vanish.
So I am skeptical that anti-tyranny rationales can be made more coherent
or palatable by formally decoupling the right to possess arms from the right
to use them.163 It seems to me that someone committed to an anti-tyranny
reading of the Second Amendment necessarily is committed to at least the
possibility of armed resistance to the government. And that possibility,
when supposedly backed by the force of law, creates conceptual and
normative trouble for the reasons discussed above.
C. Footnote Four and a Structural Second Amendment
I have argued so far that the Second Amendment lacks authority on both
Heller’s self-defense rationale and the widely endorsed anti-tyranny
readings of that amendment. What plausible interpretations are left?
162. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T.
483, 729 U.N.T.S 161.
163. There are practical and interpretive objections to this maneuver as well. Practically
speaking, it is far from clear that anything short of a private right to possess large numbers of
very sophisticated and dangerous weapons would actually serve as a deterrent to government
tyranny. (The government, after all, has an army.) As a matter of interpretation, the language
of the Second Amendment—protecting not just a right “to keep” arms, but a right “to keep
and bear” them—suggests that not merely possession, but some form of use (if only the
“carrying” of arms, which is how the Heller majority interpreted “to bear,” 554 U.S. 570,
584-91 (2008)), is allowed. This seems to further blur the possession/resistance line that
must be drawn to sustain the decoupling maneuver.
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In his dissenting opinion in Heller, Justice John Paul Stevens agreed with
the majority that the Second Amendment protects a right that can be
enforced by individuals.164 But he denied that the right in question is a right
to keep and bear arms for self-defense.165 He concluded, rather, that the
Amendment protects “a right to use and possess arms in conjunction with
service in a well-regulated militia.”166 His interpretation rested primarily on
the presence and language of what the majority called the Amendment’s
“prefatory clause”167—“[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State”168—and on the drafting and enactment history of
the amendment.169 Justice Stevens determined that the Framers intended
(and the contemporaneous public understood) the amendment to prevent the
new federal government from disarming the citizens’ militias within the
states (which were important safeguards against insurrection and invasion
in the late eighteenth century), thereby preserving the fragile federal-state
balance of power in the newly formed nation.170
Justice Stevens thus interpreted the Second Amendment in essentially
structural terms—as “a federalism provision,” as he later described it in his
McDonald dissent,171 one similar in function to the Tenth Amendment172 or
to judicially defined limits on Congress’ Commerce power.173 The point of
the amendment was not to protect individuals against private aggression,
but rather to preserve a sphere of inviolable state power against federal
164. 554 U.S. at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Surely [the Second Amendment] protects
a right that can be enforced by individuals.”).
165. See id. at 637 (“[T]there is no indication that the Framers of the [Second]
Amendment intended to enshrine the common-law right of self-defense in the
Constitution.”).
166. Id. at 651.
167. Id. at 577, 595-600 (majority opinion).
168. See id. at 640-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. See id. at 652-62.
170. See id. at 661-62.
171. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 897 (2010) (quoting Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment)).
172. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.”).
173. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2584-93 (2012)
(limiting the Commerce power to the regulation of economic “activity” rather than
inactivity); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560-67 (1995) (holding that the Commerce
power does not allow regulation of “noneconomic” activities that are not interstate or foreign
commerce); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power “[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”).
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encroachment.174 Thus the scope of the amendment extended only to the
possession and use of arms in the context of service in an organized state
militia (which today probably would mean service in a state National
Guard).
(1) Structure and Footnote Four. Justice Stevens’s structural reading of
the Second Amendment easily can be understood in Footnote Four terms.
Constitutionalizing protection for state militias against federal
encroachment most likely goes beyond the bare-bones level of constitutive
ground rules necessary for government to function, although one might
reasonably argue otherwise. But it certainly accords with the Footnote Four
worry about self-interested majorities and power entrenchment. Surely the
federal government itself cannot be trusted to uphold state autonomy or
police the boundaries of its own powers vis-à-vis those of the states. By
(partially) insulating from political control what was, in the late-eighteenth
century, a prominent source of sovereign power—armed citizens’
militias—the Second Amendment thus solved a potential powerentrenchment problem. Our reason to obey the Amendment today, so
understood, is to preserve this relatively fair and impartial resolution of one
aspect of the federal-state power struggle.
(2) Anti-tyranny redux? But does this structural-federalism interpretation
fall victim to the critique of the anti-tyranny reading I advanced in Section
IV.B, above?175 I suggested in that discussion that there is no meaningful
distinction between a legal right to possess arms for the purpose of
deterring tyranny and a legal right to use those arms to resist tyranny. And a
legal right to armed resistance of supposedly tyrannical government, I
argued, is incoherent, inconsistent with the dispute-resolution premises of
the Footnote Four account, or both.
The Heller dissenters read the Second Amendment to protect the states’
right to maintain armed, organized militias as a hedge against federal
overreaching.176 Is this simply an anti-tyranny argument in federalism’s
clothing? What would be the purpose of preserving state-controlled militias
if not to allow the states to engage in armed resistance against federal
tyranny? If that is the amendment’s purpose, then it is, as I’ve argued,
incoherent: there cannot be a legal right to violate the law. Such a purpose
also would be at odds with the notion of lawful dispute resolution that
underlies the Footnote Four approach.

174. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 643, 661-62 (2008).
175. Thanks to Colin Starger for noting this potential objection.
176. 554 U.S. at 661-62.
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However, while in some sense the structural-federalism reading is an
“anti-tyranny” reading, it differs from the interpretations discussed in
Section IV.B because it does not depend on the threat of illegal armed
resistance to lawful authority. Ensuring the states’ access to armed militias
can be understood as simply a way of reducing the states’ reliance on the
federal government. According to this reading, armed state militias can
keep the peace, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions, all without
having to call immediately on Washington (and its standing army) for
assistance. These functions preserve state autonomy without licensing
actual state resistance against the federal government. In doing so, the
Second Amendment guards against tyranny in the same indirect way that
the structural Constitution in general does: by preventing the concentration
of power in a single unit of government.
On this relatively modest structural-federalism reading, the Second
Amendment serves roughly the same function as the constitutional
reservation to the states of the general police power. A general police
power, like the power to control an armed citizens’ militia, risks misuse by
the state governments. But the risk of misuse is not the reason for reserving
the power. The reason for reserving to the states the power embodied in
armed citizens’ militias is (on this view) the preservation of some degree of
state autonomy, even when the use of armed force is required. That the
states need not call Washington every time armed troops would be helpful
does not mean that the states are licensed to deploy those troops against the
federal government.
(3) An authoritative Second Amendment? Justice Stevens’s structural
federalism reading therefore can be understood as consistent with Footnote
Four’s procedural account of constitutional authority. I acknowledge that by
distinguishing Justice Stevens’s reading from problematic anti-tyranny
interpretations, I am giving that reading the benefit of the doubt. And of
course it is reasonably possible to disagree with Justice Stevens’s reading,
either at the level of interpretive methodology or at the level of application
of methodology. It is possible, in other words, that the structural federalism
reading is an incorrect interpretation of the Second Amendment.
But we do not know the “correct” meaning of the Second Amendment or
the proper methodology for identifying that meaning. On these questions,
we humans are unavoidably fallible, and thus uncertain, and thus prone to
inevitable disagreement. The best we can do is ask whether Justice
Stevens’s interpretation is reasonable when measured against the only thing
that can matter given our fallibility: the conventions of constitutional
interpretation within the American tradition. And while the fact that four
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justices endorsed Justice Stevens’s reading may not be conclusive evidence
of its reasonableness, it should at least shift the burden of proof to anyone
seeking to argue otherwise.177
In any event, I will assume for present purposes that both Justice Scalia’s
interpretation for the majority and Justice Stevens’s for the dissent are
reasonable ones. Putting aside variations in minor details, I believe those
two readings of the Second Amendment, plus the anti-tyranny readings
canvassed above, are the only reasonable interpretations of the amendment
that can be advanced. Of these, only Justice Stevens’s structural-federalism
reading is potentially consistent with a plausible account of constitutional
authority.
V. Conclusion: The Second Amendment and the Function
of Constitutional Rights
I have argued here that the authority of constitutional law must be
justified, if it can be justified, on procedural grounds—on the basis of how
the Constitution commands us rather than what the Constitution commands.
As the case of the Second Amendment suggests, this conclusion has
particular significance for constitutional rights.
It is easy to understand many or most of our Constitution’s structural
provisions in procedural terms. Separation of powers, bicameralism,
federalism, and other structural components arising from the Constitution
typically can be seen as necessary constitutive elements of our democratic
government, or as ways to distribute and divide sovereign power so as to
solve power-entrenchment problems. But the procedural case for
constitutional rights is not so straightforward. Constitutional rights are
content-limiting, not merely constitutive: they determine which results a
fully constituted and functioning democratic government is permitted to
reach. It is tempting, then, to imagine that many or most constitutional
rights can be justified only on substantive terms—as means of protecting
certain sacrosanct moral values from democratic encroachment.
This temptation often is indulged by the commonplace observation that
the Framers, products of their time, shared a general belief in prepolitical
“natural rights.”178 From a proceduralist point of view, however, it is
interesting to note that the Framers included very few rights-conferring
177. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 636. Justice Stevens was joined in dissent by Justice Souter,
Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer.
178. E.g., BARNETT, supra note 60, at 53-86; CHESTER J. ANTIEAU, RIGHTS OF OUR
FATHERS 172-92 (1968).
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provisions in the original Constitution, believing that its structural
safeguards alone would provide ample “security . . . to the rights of the
people.”179 The effect of this forbearance, whether intended or not, was to
leave most disputes about rights—about their content, their application,
even their existence—to be worked out in the everyday democratic process,
and to constitutionalize only a set of structural ground rules for deciding
these issues fairly. The Framers may have believed in natural rights, but
their first instinct was to subject issues of rights to resolution by democratic
government, not to impose their own views about those issues on future
generations of Americans. In this sense, the 1787 Constitution was a
strikingly proceduralist document.
Of course, the Framers soon added the Bill of Rights to that document, in
part thanks to antifederalist worries that natural rights otherwise would not
be sufficiently protected.180 As Ely has shown, however, most provisions of
the Bill of Rights serve anti-entrenchment or anti-bias functions.181 The
same can be said for the rights-conferring provisions of the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments.182 The Fifteenth Amendment183 and the

179. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 57, at 265 (James Madison); see THE
FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 57, at 433, 435 (Alexander Hamilton).
[A] minute detail of particular rights is certainly far less applicable to a
Constitution like that under consideration, which is merely intended to regulate
the general political interests of the nation, than to a constitution which has the
regulation of every species of personal and private concerns. . . .
I go further, and affirm that bills of rights . . . are not only unnecessary in
the proposed Constitution, but would even be dangerous. They would contain
various exceptions to powers not granted; and, on this very account, would
afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted. . . .
....
. . . The truth is, after all the declamations we have heard, that the
Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A
BILL OF RIGHTS.
Id.
180. See UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 11, at 135-41 (describing the debates
leading to ratification of the Bill of Rights).
181. See ELY, supra note 14, at 93-98.
182. See id. at 98. Ely does concede that the Thirteenth Amendment “surely . . .
embodies a substantive judgment” against slavery, id., but of course any anti-bias provision
must embody a “substantive judgment” in this sense—that is, as a means of distinguishing
between biases that are irrational or otherwise unjustifiable and those that are not.
183. U.S. CONST. amend. XV (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude . . . .”).
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subsequent voting-rights amendments184 serve all three purposes identified
by the Footnote Four account: anti-entrenchment, anti-bias, and
constitutive.185
The Second Amendment, however, is not so easily squared with
Footnote Four. On most plausible interpretations, the amendment does
nothing more than impose a controversial substantive value—the right of
the people to keep and bear Arms—on the American public, depriving us of
our capacity to resolve that controversy through democratic means. Only
Justice Stevens’s structural-federalism reading of the amendment—
understood charitably, perhaps—can claim any grounding in the Footnote
Four account. And the Footnote Four account is the only justification of
constitutional authority that can assert any claim to plausibility.
In other words, on most readings, the Second Amendment lacks
authority. Does this fact license disobedience to the amendment—or at least
to Heller’s interpretation of the Amendment—by (say) states or localities
seeking to implement strict gun-control measures? Not necessarily; the idea
of piecemeal disobedience of the Constitution poses its own serious
difficulties on a procedural approach. But that is a topic for another day.
Here I want to conclude by suggesting two implications we might draw
about constitutional rights, and about constitutional law more generally,
from the case of the Second Amendment.
A. Footnote Four as Jurisdictional Principle
First, the fate of Heller’s Second Amendment on a Footnote Four
account suggests a principle of constitutional jurisdiction—a meaningful
boundary line between those subjects that legitimately can be
constitutionalized and those that cannot. Some issues (involving the basic
structure of government, the political rights of democratic minorities, the
fair treatment of historically victimized groups) cannot be resolved by
everyday democracy without raising serious constitutive, entrenchment, or
bias problems. These issues are properly resolved, at least at last resort,

184. See id. amend. XXVI (“The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen
years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of age.”); id. amend. XXIV (“The right of citizens of the United States to
vote in any [federal election] shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any
State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.”); id. amend. XIX (“The right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
by any State on account of sex.”).
185. Ely discusses these franchise-enlarging amendments at ELY, supra note 14, at 9899.
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through extra-democratic constitutional processes. That is, they are
appropriate subjects of constitutional law.
But most politically contested issues do not fit this description. The issue
of whether and how to allow individual gun possession for self-defense, for
example, is perfectly susceptible of fair resolution through the majoritarian
democratic process. Of course, many Americans will not like the outcome
of that resolution, but this is an inevitable feature of any dispute-resolution
process. The same holds for other purely substantive topics of dispute, such
as (for example) whether it is bad or wrong or harmful to consume
alcoholic beverages. Footnote Four thus explains the now-commonplace
notion that the Eighteenth Amendment186 was not just a bad idea but
affirmatively unsuitable for inclusion in the Constitution—that is, outside
the Constitution’s proper jurisdiction.187
This jurisdictional principle also might be used to critique other
provisions of our Constitution or particular interpretations of those
provisions. Consider the right to choose an abortion first declared in Roe v.
Wade188 and upheld in truncated form in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.189
As the Roe Court understood the right, it embodied a pregnant woman’s
strong personal interests in liberty and autonomy,190 interests that were
powerful enough to outweigh the uncertain, inchoate interest of the state in
preserving the life of the fetus before viability. Roe thus exemplifies the
doctrine of “substantive” due process, which limits the authority of the
government to infringe certain “fundamental” personal liberty interests.
So understood, the abortion right, and other manifestations of substantive
due process, do not fit Footnote Four.191 As with Heller’s substantive right
of armed self-defense,192 the right to abortion clearly is not a constitutive
rule of the type necessary to create basic institutions and procedures of
democratic government. Nor is it an anti-entrenchment rule: unlike
restrictions on voting or political expression, restrictions on abortion do not
186. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933) (prohibiting “the manufacture, sale, or
transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation
thereof from the United States”).
187. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 14, at 99 (describing the Eighteenth Amendment as an
“attempt[] to freeze substantive values” that “do[es] not belong in a constitution”).
188. 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973).
189. 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992).
190. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (“The detriment that the State would impose upon the
pregnant woman by denying this choice [to terminate a pregnancy] altogether is apparent.”).
191. Ely himself thought Roe was wrongly decided. See John Hart Ely, The Wages of
Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
192. See discussion supra Section IV.A.
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make it more difficult to unseat government officials or the current political
majority.
There is, I think, a nearly irrefutable argument that abortion restrictions
unfairly limit the ability of women to participate fully in social, economic,
and political life, and a plausible argument that such restrictions often are
motivated by gender or religious bias. An abortion right thus might be
understood to fulfill the anti-bias function of constitutional law on the
Footnote Four approach: abortion restrictions tend to handicap women’s
participation in the democratic process, and the political majority cannot be
trusted to determine whether and when this is so because of persistent
gender and religious prejudice.
The trouble is that Roe was not written as an anti-bias decision, and
substantive due process doctrine more generally is not animated by antibias concerns. Roe grounds the right it upholds, not in the danger of
systemic bias against the regulated class—essentially an equal-protection
concern—but rather in the notion that the interests of persons in that class
are too important to be regulated by the majority. This is the essence of
substantive due process: the premise that there are certain substantive
outcomes the democratic process is not entitled to reach. Heller shares that
premise. The premise might make sense if we have consented to place those
outcomes off-limits, or if the Constitution or its Framers could identify offlimits outcomes better than we can. But none of these contentions are
plausible, as I’ve argued.
So the critique of Heller also applies to the doctrine of substantive due
process. That said, I suspect many manifestations of substantive due
process, including the abortion right, can be justified on alternative
Footnote Four grounds,193 just as the Second Amendment might be. The
193. Several prominent scholars have suggested that a better grounding for the Roe result
would have been equal protection—specifically the need to protect women from the
political, social, and economic disabilities imposed by unwanted pregnancies. See, e.g., Jack
M. Balkin, Jack M. Balkin (judgment of the Court), in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE
SAID 31, 42-45 (Jack M. Balkin, ed., 2005); Reva B. Siegel, Reva B. Siegel (concurring), in
WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra, at 63, 63-82. The plurality in Casey hinted at
such a grounding for the abortion right. See 505 U.S. at 835 (“The ability of women to
participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their
ability to control their reproductive lives.”). Similarly, substantive due process decisions
protecting homosexual conduct, such as Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), might be
understood in Footnote Four terms, as safeguards against irrational majority bias directed at
homosexuals. (Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lawrence, which relied on equal
protection rather than substantive due process, would have taken essentially this approach.
See 539 U.S. at 579.)
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most important lesson of Heller therefore might be one of flexibility in
constitutional interpretation. I have more to say on that point below.
Footnote Four’s implicit jurisdictional principle also can be deployed to
evaluate the suitability of proposed constitutional amendments. Consider
recent proposals to amend the Constitution to prohibit desecration of the
national flag194 or to ban recognition of same-sex marriage.195 I happen to
think both of these measures would be very bad policy, but the Footnote
Four critique of Heller suggests a more categorical reason to oppose them:
neither could be justified on procedural grounds. No conceivable
constitutive, anti-entrenchment, or anti-bias purpose would be served by
banning flag desecration (as opposed to protecting it, as the Free Speech
Clause now does),196 or by prohibiting same-sex marriage (as opposed to
allowing it, as the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses now do).197 To
adopt these amendments would simply be an attempt to bind future
democratic majorities to the current majority’s preferred substantive values.
It is worth noting that substantive accounts of authority cannot yield a
jurisdictional principle of this sort. Consensualist and Moral Guidance
accounts offer no basis for identifying appropriate subjects of constitutional
amendment; so long as an amendment achieves sufficient consent or is
adopted by a comparatively wise framing process, anything goes.
(Ironically, these substantive accounts provide no substantive criteria for
deciding what should go into a constitution.) Moral Content accounts, in
contrast, turn entirely on substance (if it is morally good or just, it gets in)
and thus reduce the question of constitutional jurisdiction to the inherently
contentious question of substantive merit.
B. Authoritativeness as Interpretive Principle
An authority-based analysis of the Second Amendment implies an
interpretive principle as well as a jurisdictional one. Heller’s Second
Amendment lacks authority, but the Heller dissenters’ Second Amendment
arguably possesses it. We have no duty to obey a constitutional command
194. See, e.g., Flag-burning Amendment Fails by One Vote, CNN (June 28, 2006), http://
www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/06/27/flag.burning/index.html.
195. See, e.g., Laurie Kellman, Gay Marriage Ban Falls Short of Majority, WASH. POST
(June 7, 2006, 2:42 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/
06/07/AR2006060700929_pf.html.
196. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
197. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (invalidating state laws restricting
marriage to different-sex couples on substantive due process and equal protection grounds);
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (invalidating federal statute prohibiting
recognition of same-sex marriages on substantive due process and equal protection grounds).
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that lacks authority, as I explained in Part II. All else being equal, the Court
should interpret constitutional provisions in the way that best justifies our
duty to obey them. And so (all else being equal) we ought to prefer the
Heller dissenters’ reading of the Second Amendment to the majority’s,
because the dissenters’ reading better justifies the amendment’s authority.
This conclusion might be generalized roughly as follows: as between two
or more reasonable interpretations of a constitutional provision, all else
being equal, a court should choose the one that better accords with a
plausible account of constitutional authority. This principle, of course,
would require that courts and other interpreters consciously take the
question of constitutional authority into account in deciding what the
Constitution means.
Elsewhere, I have argued for this proposition at the level of general
theories or methodologies of constitutional interpretation.198 The question
of interpretive methodology is in essence a question about the appropriate
source of constitutional norms—about where those norms may be found.
May an interpreter derive constitutional norms from somewhere other than
the text (given endemic textual underdeterminacy, the answer has to be
yes), and if so, from where? Must the norms be derived from some fact
about the world as it existed when the text was created or ratified (the
authors’ intentions, the public’s understanding of the text’s meaning)—an
originalist premise? Or may the norms come from somewhere else:
evolving traditions, perhaps, or even the dictates of justice or good policy as
argued by the litigants or determined by the court? May nontextually
derived constitutional norms ever override the norms clearly communicated
by the text? When we debate interpretive methodology, these are the kinds
of questions we are asking.
I have argued in prior work that these questions about the source of
constitutional norms should be answered in the way that best makes sense
of constitutional authority.199 The sources to which we look to identify
norms ought to reflect the reasons why we think those norms are
authoritative. Because the best account of constitutional authority is a
procedural account along Footnote Four lines, I have contended that
interpreters should look for sources of constitutional norms that can fulfill
the constitutive, anti-entrenchment, or anti-bias functions of constitutional
law on such an account. The text is one such source, since the text by itself

198. See Peters, Originalism, supra note 55, at 189; Peters, What Lies Beneath, supra
note 19.
199. See generally Peters, What Lies Beneath, supra note 19.
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is capable of communicating constitutive rules and (as an inanimate object)
feels no irrational bias or temptation to entrench its own power. Original
intent or meaning can be another such source; long-dead Framers have no
interest in entrenching the power of current majorities or government
officials. The considered moral and political judgments of life-tenured
judges, narrowed and informed by the adversarial adjudicative process, can
be yet another source of relative impartiality on issues involving the
potential for entrenchment or irrational bias.
I thus have suggested that the Footnote Four account leads to a relatively
flexible, capacious approach to constitutional interpretation. Of course,
such an approach often will leave open the possibility of multiple
alternative interpretations of any given constitutional provision in any given
case. In fact, even methodologies that are more dogmatic frequently will
underdetermine the meaning and application of a particular constitutional
provision. “New Originalist” theorists like Randy Barnett and Larry Solum,
for example, acknowledge that their “original meaning” approach often
leaves considerable room for judicial “construction” of constitutional
meaning when the original meaning of a constitutional provision runs
out.200
A commitment to a methodology of interpretation, then, frequently will
not determine the result of a particular constitutional case. Zones of
indeterminate meaning will appear with regularity under most or all
plausible interpretive approaches. And the analysis in this Article implies
that within these zones of indeterminacy, the interpreter’s decision about
what a particular constitutional provision means should be influenced,
perhaps even driven, by considerations of authority. If the provision would
possess authority on one possible meaning and would lack it on another,
then the interpreter—barring some extrinsic reason to the contrary—ought
to choose the meaning that confers authority. Just as no provision of the
Constitution should be presumed to be without effect,201 no provision
should be presumed to lack authority.
The underlying difficulty, of course, may well be that judges (and other
Americans) fundamentally disagree about why the Constitution has
authority over us. But we shouldn’t accept this disagreement as a given.
200. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 60, at 118-30; Lawrence B. Solum, The
Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010); Lawrence B.
Solum, Semantic Originalism 67-87 (U. Ill. C. L., Pub. L. & Legal Theory Res. Paper Series
No. 07-24) (Nov. 22, 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244.
201. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (“It cannot be
presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect . . . .”).
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Unlike interpretive methodology or the meaning of particular provisions,
the problem of constitutional authority is woefully underexplored in our
jurisprudence, so much so that it is rarely clear whether or on what basis
people disagree about it. How we interpret and apply the Constitution ought
to depend on why we are doing so—on why we think the Constitution binds
us in the first place. Heller’s troubling Second Amendment should prompt
us to take that fundamental question seriously.
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